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ABSTRACT
Goldman Sachs and American International Group on the eve
of the 2008 financial crisis were bound together through a web of
credit risk transfer (CRT) contracts in the form of credit default
swaps (CDSs) and synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).
Synthetic CDOs enabled certain hedge funds to profit from the ulti-
mate bursting of the housing bubble due to the funds' savvy in un-
derstanding CRT better than their counterparties. This Article con-
structs a novel theory of CRT that extends the insights of creditor
governance theory to CRT transactions. By doing so, this Article es-
tablishes a framework for good CRT governance. CRT governance
consists of the transaction structures and practices adopted to protect
investors (or counterparties) against losses from the underlying cred-
it risk being transferred. Good governance requires governance
mechanisms to reduce the informational asymmetries and incentive
misalignments of particular CRT transactions-the agency costs of
CRT.
In practice, most types of CRT transactions are generally well
governed and do not contribute to systemic risk despite being lightly
regulated. Accordingly, it is incorrect to view the destabilizing losses
from subprime residential mortgage-related CRT in 2008 as an inevi-
table result of CRT transactions being insufficiently regulated or fun-
damentally flawed. The financial crisis is best understood as resulting
from the uniquely poor governance of certain cash CDOs and super
senior tranches of synthetic CDOs. This Article concludes by identify-
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ing several implications of CRT governance for financial regulators
implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"It is a tangled hairball of risk.., any savvy investor would have
thrown this in the trash bin. " 1
On the eve of the near collapse of financial markets in 2008, two
financial industry titans were locked in a heated battle. Goldman
Sachs (Goldman) was demanding that American International
Group, Inc. (AIG) post additional collateral pursuant to their credit
default swap (CDS) contracts.2 AIG sold CDSs to Goldman referenc-
ing Goldman's synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that
were backed by the value of residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBSs) . AIG had also directly purchased CDOs from Goldman,
and Goldman had purchased CDSs referencing AIG's public bonds.4
Standing in the middle of similar CDOs issued by Goldman was
hedge fund manager John Paulson. In 2007, Paulson approached
Goldman to sponsor a synthetic CDO that would enable him to bene-
Carrick Mollenkamp & Serena Ng, Wall Street Wizardry Amplified Credit Crisis,
WALL ST.J., Dec. 27, 2007, at Al (quotingJanet Tavakoli regarding a synthetic collat-
eralized debt obligation).
2 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, AIG-GOLDMAN SACHS COLLATERAL CALL TIMELINE &
SUPPORTING Docs 2 (2010), available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn-media/fcic-testimony/2010-0701-Goldman-AIG-
Collateral-Call-timeline.pdf.
" Jody Shenn & Bob Ivry, Abacus Let Goldman Shuffle Mortgage Risk Like Beads,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Apr. 17, 2010, 2:52 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-
04-16/goldman-used-abacus-to-shuffle-debt-risk-like-beads.html.
See AIG EXTERNAL CDS NOTIONAL BY COUNTERPARTY AS OF 9/15/08 (2008),
available at http://grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/Attachment-l.pdf.
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fit from a decline in the housing market.5 Paulson had input over
which RMBSs would serve as the basis of the CDO. At the same time,
Paulson used CDSs to take a short position in the CDO that would
earn a profit if housing market collapsed. 6 Paulson's savvy trade
eventually earned his fund approximately $1 billion. 7
The foregoing complex web of contracts was the result of the
parties' attempt to transfer credit risk: CDSs, CDOs, and mortgage-
backed securities are all instruments of credit risk transfer (CRT).
This Article examines CRT transactions such as those involving
Goldman, AIG, and Paulson's hedge fund. It does so by constructing
a novel theory of CRT that focuses on governance.8 CRT governance
consists of the transaction structures and practices adopted to protect
investors (or counterparties) against losses from the underlying cred-
it risk being transferred. Good CRT governance can protect investors
(or counterparties) from losses even if the underlying assets whose
credit risk is transferred experience significant losses.9 Bad CRT gov-
ernance, by contrast, creates transaction structures that leave parties
Complaint at 6, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10
Civ. 3229 (BJ) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/201 0/comp-pr2010-59.pdf.
6 Id. at 2.
Dan Wilchins & Karen Brettell, Factbox: How Goldman's ABACUS Deal Worked,
REUTERS, Apr. 16, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/16/us-
goldmansachs-abacus-factbox-idUSTRE63F5CZ20100416.
The term "governance" as used in this Article refers to the overt activities or
broader market phenomena that control or place limitations upon parties' financial
relationships, including purely contract-based forms of governance. See Michael R.
Roberts & Amir Sufi, Financial Contracting: A Survey of Empirical Research and Future Di-
rections, 1 ANN. REv. FIN. ECON. 1, 2 (2009) ("[Flinancial contracting is one form of
corporate governance."). Governance includes risk management, but is a broader
concept that also includes efforts to enforce financial rights and efficiently structure
transactions.
9 While good governance is not sufficient to assure that CRT investors or coun-
terparties will receive a positive return on their investment, will properly hedge an
existing risk, or that a transaction is the most cost effective, good governance is likely
to at least get parties in the right structural "ballpark" to prevent the types of extreme
losses that cause systemically destabilizing losses. See Sanjai Bhagat, et al., The Effect of
Corporate Governance on Performance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SYNTHESIS OF
THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 97, 118 (H. Kent Baker & Ronald Anderson eds.,
2010) (noting empirical studies documenting that "better governance is sometimes
related to some measures of [better] performance"). Practitioners have also identi-
fied best practices for securitization transactions that are consistent with, and provide
more detail to, good CRT governance in the securitization context. See MARKUS
KREBSZ, SECURITIZATION AND STRUCTURED FINANCE POST CREDIT CRUNCH: A BEST
PRACTICE DEAL LIFECYCLE GUIDE 23-45 (2011).
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with highly sensitive exposures to losses in underlying credit assets.10
Focusing on CRT governance is important because governance quali-
ty is a major factor in determining whether the parties will suffer loss-
es or expose the entire economy to risk.
My theory of CRT governance takes as its starting point the dis-
tinction between funded and unfunded CRT transactions." A funded
CRT transaction has the same general structure as an ordinary loan: a
lump sum payment of principal is made upfront by a lender who, in
turn, expects to be paid interest and eventually repaid the principal.
Securitization transactions are funded CRT because securitization in-
volves a special purpose vehicle (SPV) borrowing funds from inves-
tors in exchange for issuing debt-like securities to them. 2 The SPV
pays its investors periodic interest payments from cash flows obtained
from a group of loans or other receivables that are owned by the SPV
and that constitute the SPV's collateral. 13 Unfunded CRT, by con-
trast, is similar in structure to insurance. In an unfunded CRT trans-
action, one party receives periodic interest-like payments. In ex-
10 Both good and bad governance can be efficient, so long as the price of a CRT
instrument accurately reflects the protection provided by governance mechanisms in
relation to the credit risk being transferred. However, if the price of a CRT instru-
ment fails to reflect the risk of a poorly governed transaction that transfers significant
credit risk, the transaction may cause substantial unexpected losses to both parties
and even contribute to systemic risk. These principles of CRT governance are re-
flected in the following observation regarding CRT in the form of residential mort-
gage-backed securities (RMBS):
When PD [probability of default] is relatively low, it is possible to make
high-quality (AAA-rated) CDO tranches with close to zero EL [ex-
pected losses] out of RMBS mezzanine tranches, although the CDO
tranches often have ULs [unexpected losses] that cannot be ignored.
On the other hand, for subprime mortgages or in situations where PD
rises to 5%, even a credit enhancement of 50% is not enough to make
the senior tranche of the CDO safe in terms of EL. Moreover, the cor-
responding UL is substantial.
Ashish Dev & Bo Qian, Guilty or Not?, RISK.NET (Feb. 1, 2009),
http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/analysis/1497954/guilty.
" Kiff, Michaud, and Mitchell also note the importance of the fund-
ed/unfunded distinction to CRT governance issues. SeeJohn Kiff, et al., An Analyti-
cal Review of Credit Risk Transfer Instruments, 21 BANQUE DE FR. FIN. STABILITY REV. 106,
133, 138, 145 (2003), available at http://www.banque-
france.fr/fileadmin/user-upload/banque-defrance/publications/Revue de la sta
bilitefinanciere/etud5_0603.pdf.
" See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN.J.L. Bus. & FIN.
133, 135 (1994).
13 If the transfer of risk to the SPV takes place by selling loans or bonds to the
SPV, then it is a "cash" securitization. If the transfer of risk takes place by the SPV
selling CDS protection referencing the loans or bonds, then the securitization is syn-
thetic. The mechanics of cash and synthetic securitization are further detailed infra
Part V.
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change, that party agrees to make a lump sum payment to the party
making the periodic payments contingent on some event taking
place. A CDS is an unfunded CRT transaction because it involves one
party collecting periodic payments based on the risk of a reference
debt obligation in exchange for being required to make a lump sum
payment if the reference obligation defaults or some other "credit
event" takes place.1 4 In both funded and unfunded CRT transactions,
there is always a credit risk seller and buyer. The credit risk seller is
the party that uses the CRT transaction to transfer credit risk and
does so by making periodic interest-like payments. The credit risk
buyer is the party that takes on credit risk by receiving the periodic
payments and making (or, in the case of unfunded CRT, agreeing to
make) a principal-like payment. The distinction between funded and
unfunded CRT is fundamental to governance because funded and
unfunded transactions have different types of agency costs and must
adopt different governance mechanisms to reduce them.
The following two Figures illustrate the relationship between
credit risk, cash flows, and unfunded and funded transaction struc-
tures.
Figure 1: CDS (Unfunded Transaction)
Periodic Cash Flows
Risk Seller Risk Buyer
4 -----------------------
Contingent Payment
"4 The mechanics of CDSs are further detailed infra Part IV.
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Figure 2: Securitization (Funded Transaction)
Sale of Collateral to Periodic Cash Flows
SPV
SPV
Risk Seller Risk Buyer
Collateral
Initial Payment to Risk Loan from Risk Buyers
Seller from Sale to SPV to SPV
By developing a theory of CRT governance, this Article contrib-
utes to several distinct bodies of literature. First, it broadens the
scope of creditor governance research and scholarship. 5 Creditor
governance literature typically focuses on traditional credit instru-
ments such as loans and bonds. This Article, however, generalizes
and extends its analysis to credit instruments in the form of securit-
ized debt and over-the-counter derivatives (i.e., CDSs). Second, this
Article contributes to the literature on CRT. Most analyses of CRT
focus on the efficiency or benefits of CRT transactions or their im-
pact on credit creation, risk taking, and systemic risk.1' This Article
15 See, e.g., Charles K Whitehead, Creditors and Debt Governance, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 68, 68-84 (Claire Hill & Brett
McDonnell eds., 2012) [hereinafter Whitehead, Debt Governance]; Charles K. White-
head, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and Corporate Governance, 34J.
CORP. L. 641 (2009) [hereinafter Whitehead, Evolution of Debt]; Frederick Tung, Lev-
erage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance,
57 UCLA L. REv. 115 (2009); Greg Nini, et al., Creditor Control Rights, Corporate
Governance, and Firm Value (Dec. 11, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1344302. Corporate govern-
ance research typically focuses on the role of equityholders and directors, not credi-
tors. See Lucian Bebchuk & Michael S. Weisbach, The State of Corporate Governance Re-
search, 23 REv. FIN. STUDIES 939 (2010).
16 See, e.g., Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, Credit Risk Transfer and Contagion, 53J.
MONETARY ECON. 89 (2005), available at
http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Carletti/JME06-Allen-Carletti.pdf; Gabriella Chiesa,
Optimal Credit Risk Transfer, Monitored Finance, and Banks, 17 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION
464 (2008); Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Deriva-
tives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019 (2007); Darrell Duffie, Innovations in Credit Risk Transfer:
Implications for Financial Stability (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Papers No. 255,
2008), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work255.htm; Benedikt Goderis, et al.,
SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1009
adds to that literature by examining the role of governance mecha-
nisms in reducing risk. Although an article by John Kiff, Francois-
Louis Michaud, and Janet Mitchell examines the agency costs of CRT
and notes the mechanisms used to reduce them, 7 this Article discuss-
es governance mechanisms far more extensively and also evaluates
strengths and weaknesses in the governance of CRT transactions in
wake of the financial crisis of 2008. By doing so, this Article estab-
lishes a framework for good CRT governance.
This Article also contributes to the ongoing debate surrounding
the financial crisis. In particular, this Article's account of CRT gov-
ernance challenges much of the conventional and scholarly analysis
of CRT. Under the more conventional view, the destabilizing losses
from subprime residential mortgage-related CRT were an inevitable
result of CRT transactions being insufficiently regulated or funda-
mentally flawed. 8 For example, Professor Lynn Stout argues that the
root cause of the financial crisis was a lack of regulation that enabled
speculative CDSs trading,'9 and Professor Brian Quinn argues that the
financial crisis reflects the failure of private markets to overcome the
Bank Behavior with Access to Credit Risk Transfer Markets (Bank of Fin., Research Discus-
sion Paper No. 4 2006), available at
http://www.suomenpankki.fi/en/julkaisut/tutkimukset/keskustelualoitteet/Docum
ents/0704netti.pdf; Wolf Wagner & Ian W. Marsh, Credit Risk Transfer and Financial
Sector Performance (Ctr. Econ. Pol'y Research, Discussion Paper No. 4265, 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=519101; Mascia Bedendo & Brunella Bruno,
Credit Risk Transfer Strategies of U.S. Commercial Banks: What Has Changed Dur-
ing the 2007-2009 Crisis? (July 30, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=13436271; Patrick Behr & Samuel Lee, Credit Risk Trans-
fer, Delegated Monitoring, Real Sector Productivity, and Financial Deepening (Feb.
21, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=675642;
Rob Nijskens & Wolf Wagner, Credit Risk Transfer Activities and Systemic Risk: How
Banks Became Less Risky Individually But Posed Greater Risks to the Financial Sys-
tem at the Same Time (Dec. 23, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 319689.
'7 SeeKiff etal., supra note 11, at 111-16.
8 See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime
Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1257, 1262 (2009); Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk
Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REv.
493, 495-99, 509-32 (2009); Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why
Securities Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 5 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1359, 1361-62 (2009); Georgette C. Phillips, The Jumbled Alphabet Soup of the Col-
lapsed Home Mortgage Market: ABCP, CDO, CDS and RMBS, 18 U. MIAMI Bus. L. Rv.
143, 145 (2010).
" Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV.
Bus. L. Rv. 1 (2011). Professor Stout's seminal contribution to the law and econom-
ics of speculation is presented in Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regula-
tion and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701 (1999).
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adverse selection and moral hazard problems inherent in securitiza-
tion and CDSs.20
To the contrary, I find that most types of CRT transactions are
generally well governed and do not contribute to systemic risk despite
being lightly regulated. This finding has two important implications.
The first is that the CRT governance mechanisms adopted by market
participants are typically good enough to substantially reduce the in-
herent adverse selection, moral hazard, and other agency costs of
CRT. Indeed, in both the CDS and securitization markets, destabiliz-
ing economy-wide losses in 2008 resulted solely from CRT transac-
tions tied to subprime mortgage markets, including the repo and
commercial paper markets, which used subprime mortgage-related
securities as collateral for short-term financing.2' These destabilizing
CRT transactions were the exception, however, and not the rule.
Most types of CRT transactions do not transfer residential mortgage-
related credit risk. Second, the fact that most types of CRT transac-
tions are well governed despite being lightly regulated indicates that
a lack of regulation is a poor indicator of CRT outcomes-of whether
CRT transactions will lead to losses for investors or disrupt the finan-
cial system. Similarly, given that none of the destabilizing CDS trans-
actions underlying the financial crisis were speculative,22 whether a
CRT transaction is undertaken for purely speculative or genuine
hedging purposes tell us little, if anything, about the governance
quality or stability of such transactions.
The destabilizing losses in CRT markets in 2008 are best under-
stood as resulting from the uniquely poor governance of certain
CDSs and CDOs. The prices of these instruments failed to reflect
20 Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 5
N.Y.U.J.L. & Bus. 549, 567-80, 588 (2009).
21 See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Haircuts, FED. RES. BANK ST. Louis REv.,
Nov./Dec. 2010, at 507, 512-14; Daniel Covitz, et al., The Evolution of a Financial Cri-
sis: Panic in the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market (Fed. Reserve Bank, Working Pa-
per No. 2009-36, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200936/200936pap.pdf; David Ev-
ans, Unsafe Heavens, BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 2007),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=nw&pname=mm 1007_story2.html.
22 See, e.g., The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis
Inquiry Comm'n, l11th Cong. 2 (2010) (testimony of David A. Viniar, Chief Fin. Of-
ficer, The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc.) ("[Goldman] entered into offsetting contracts
(bought protection) with AIG to manage the resulting [super senior CDO] exposure
in our books."); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT
143 (2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn-media/fcic-
reports/fcicfinal-reportfull.pdf (noting that Goldman Sachs hedged its "long po-
sition [tied to mortgage backed securities] by buying credit protection from AIG");
id. at 295.
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that they were poorly governed yet nonetheless transferring massive
credit risk from subprime RMBSs. 3 Investors and counterparties ex-
posed to these second-level CRT transactions failed to appreciate
24
their risk and accordingly did not adopt good governance. Fortu-
nately, as the structure of the first subprime RMBS since the financial
crisis indicates, parties have learned and are adopting better govern-
ance because they perceive subprime mortgages as being much more
risky.25
23 Subprime RMBS themselves were mispriced due to market participants incor-
rectly estimating the likelihood of declines in housing prices, problems unique to
residential mortgage finance, and price distortions stemming from poor governance
of the CDSs and CDOs that transferred their risk. See VIRAL AcHARAYA ET AL.,
GUARANTEED TO FAIL: FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND THE DEBACLE OF MORTGAGE
FINANCE 38-46 (2011) (arguing that the growth in subprime securitization was
caused by too-big-to-fail private firms attempting to compete with government spon-
sored enterprises); ARNOLD KLING, NOT WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND: A HISTORY OF
POLICIES THAT PRODUCED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 13-22 (2009); Adam J. Levitin
& Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177, 1228-52
(2012); Christopher Mayer, Housing, Subprime Mortgages, and Securitization: How
Did We Go Wrong and What Can We Learn So This Doesn't Happen Again? 1-5,
(Feb 27, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/Housing-Subprime.pdf ; Paul Willen,
Part 2: A Closer Look at Michael Lewis's "The Big Short," FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA (Aug.
10, 2010), http://realestateresearch.frbatlanta.org/rer/2010/08/part-2-a-closer-
look-at-michael-lewiss-the-big-short.html (noting that the "actual [housing] price fall
that took place was roughly twice as bad as the meltdown" estimated by Lehman
Brothers researchers).
24 The destabilizing CDSs and CDOs were "second-level" CRT, which means that
they re-transferred the risk of CRT instruments-of RMBS. See infra Part VI.B. It is
important to note that subprime RMBS by themselves were not so poorly governed
that the losses suffered by RMBS investors would have caused the financial crisis. In-
deed, through the end of 2010 the overwhelming majority of the highest-rated sub-
prime RMBSs experienced no cash flow problems and will likely never default with
substantial losses. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 22, at 228 ("[A]t the end of
2010 most of the triple-A tranches of mortgage-backed securities have avoided actual
losses in cash flow through and may avoid significant realized losses going forward..
. Overall, for 2005 to 2007 vintage tranches of mortgage-backed securities originally
rated triple-A ... only about 10% of Alt-A and 4% of subprime securities had been
'materially impaired."'); Gary Gorton & Guillermo Ordonez, Collateral Crises 1 (Jan.
13, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984715
("[An estimate that] calculates the realized principal losses on the $1.9 trillion of
AAA/Aaa-rated subprime bonds issued between 2004 and 2007 to be 17 basis points
[i.e., 1/100th of a percent] as of February 2011. The subprime shock was not large..
• ."); Fitch Takes Various Actions on 1,246 U.S. Subprime RMBS Deals, Bus. WIRE (March
22, 2011), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110322007059/en/Fitch-
Takes-Actions-1246-U.S.-Subprime-RMBS ("Fitch projects a cumulative principal re-
covery of over 90% for all senior classes [of subprime RMBS] issued between 2005
and 2008.").
25 See Houman B. Shadab, Spingleaf and RMBS 2.0, LAWBITRAGE (Sept. 6, 2011,
2:25 P.M.), http://lawbitrage.typepad.com/blog/2011/09/spingleaf-and-rmbs-
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Unlike other explanations of the financial crisis, my analysis ex-
plains why the CDS market remained generally stable through the fi-
nancial crisis despite the large and unexpected payouts by CDS sellers
and the failure of Lehman Brothers, a major derivatives dealer.26 It
likewise explains why securitizations that transferred non-subprime
mortgage-related risk were not a primary cause of the crisis. For ex-
ample, securitization transactions that transferred the risk of corpo-
rate loans (collateralized loan obligations) and commercial real es-
tate (commercial mortgage-backed securities) performed relatively
well through and in the aftermath of the financial crisis, and led the
revitalization of securitization markets in 201 1.27 Explanations of the
financial crisis that broadly generalize based on the losses from sub-
prime mortgage-related CRT, or view light regulation as playing a
primary role, fail to account for the general stability of CRT markets
and, accordingly, offer a fundamentally flawed perspective.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II lays the foundation of
CRT governance by identifying the fundamental features of credit
and counterparty risk and reviewing the primary motivations for
transferring credit risk. Part III generalizes and applies creditor gov-
ernance theory to CRT transactions. In Part IV, this Article examines
CRT governance in the context of CDS transactions, and Part V ex-
amines CRT governance in the context of securitization transactions.
Part VI then applies my theory of CRT governance to several types of
transactions whose governance I categorize as good, bad, or savvy.
This Article concludes by identifying important implications of CRT
governance for financial regulators implementing the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.8 An im-
portant implication of my theory of CRT governance is that addition-
al regulation may increase the risk of CRT transactions.
20.html. The same observation applies to post-crisis commercial mortgage-backed
securities. Id.
26 For more detail on the Lehman Brother's bankruptcy, see BANK OF INT'L
SEYrLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW, DECEMBER 2008, at 6-7 Box 1 (2008); Karen
Brettell, Lehman CDS Counterparties Begin Resetting Trades, REUTERS, Sept. 15, 2008,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/15/us-lehman-derivatives-
idUSN1529868020080915; Press Release, The Depository Trust & Clearing Corpora-
tion, DTCC Successfully Closes out Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy (Oct. 30,
2008) [hereinafter DTCC Press Release], available at
http://www.dtcc.com/news/press/releases/2008/dtcc closes_lehman-cds.php.
27 See infra Part VI.A.2-3. Securitizations that transferred the risk of consumer
loans also never experienced any more distress than would be expected in a long and
deep recession. See CAPITAL AivSoRs GROUP, ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES: TIME TO
REEVALUATE THEIR PLACE IN CoRPoRATE ACCOUNTS? 6-7 (2011).
28 Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1073, 124 Stat. 1376, 2060-67 (2010) (codified in scat-
tered sections of the U.S. Code).
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II. CREDIT RISK AND ITS TRANSFER
A. The Nature of Credit Instruments
A credit instrument is a type of financial contract under which a
debtor borrows funds from, and must repay, a creditor. 29  The
amount, timing, and other circumstances under which the repayment
must be made vary among different types of credit instruments.
Commercial loans and corporate bonds are two common types of
credit instruments. Credit instruments originate credit risk, and that
risk (and the corresponding right to repayment) can also be trans-
ferred from credit risk sellers to credit risk buyers through a wide vari-
ety of CRT transactions such as loan guarantees, sales, and syndica-
tion. The focus of this Article is on CRT transactions and instru-
instruments in the form of securitization transactions and CDSs.
B. Credit Risk and Counterparty Credit Risk
Credit risk is the risk that a creditor will not be repaid in whole,
in part, or on time. 30 Generally, the higher the credit risk of an in-
strument, the higher is its interest rate.31 When a debtor defaults, the
creditor is typically still able to recover some amount of the princi-
31pal. Credit risk is comprised of component risks such as credit-
spread risk and prepayment risk and is related to risks, such as liquid-
ity risk and interest rate risk.33 Prepayment risk is a problem particu-
lar to securitization that may deprive investors of expected cash flows
if the underlying borrowers refinance in response to decreased inter-
34
est rates.
Credit risk has unique properties that differentiate it from mar-
ket risk and other types of financial risk. First, the typical credit risk
payoff distribution is asymmetric and often reflects a binary "default"
or "no default" outcome, which leads to losses from credit risk having
2 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 2008) (defining debtor as
"[o]ne who owes a debt or the performance of an obligation to another, who is
called the creditor").
o See PETER CHRISTOFFERSEN, ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT 7 (2nd
ed. 2011).
' N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 557 (6th ed. 2011).
12 MOORAD CHOUDHRY, STRUCTURED CREDIT PRODUCTS: CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND
SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATION 29-32, 235 (2d ed. 2010).
" FRANKJ. FABozzi, FIXED INCOME SECURITIES 17-20 (2d. ed. 2002).
3' VINOD KOTHARI, SECURITIZATION--THE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT OF THE FUTURE
235-37 (2006).
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the potential to be large relative to other risks.35 In addition, changes
in credit risk and the correlation between different credit risks are
generally difficult to measure, observe, and hence predict.36 Credit
losses depend upon relatively infrequent data about defaults, the val-
ue of collateral, contractual support mechanisms such as third party
guarantees, and uncertainties relating to legal enforcement of credi-
• 37
tors' rights. Credit risk relationships are also often intended to last
several years, which results in credit instruments being relatively illiq-
uid and requires credit risk models to attempt to predict cash flows
38
over a long period of time.
Credit risk may also exist between both parties to a transaction
(i.e., bilaterally). This risk is known as counterparty credit risk (or
simply "counterparty risk"), and it arises when both sides of a credit
39
transaction are exposed to the failure of the other to pay. Unfund-
ed credit transactions such as CDSs create counterparty risk because
either party may default on its obligation to pay the other throughout40
the life of the transaction. By contrast, in a funded credit transac-
tion only creditors run the risk of not being repaid because debtors
have already received the payment of principal from creditors. Cred-
it risk in funded transactions is unilateral.
'5 STEVE L. ALLEN, FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO
MANAGING MARKET AND CREDIT RISK 16 (2003); CHARLES GoODHART ET AL., FINANCIAL
REGULATION: WHY, How, AND WHERE Now? 87 (1998).
36 GOODHART ET AL., supra note 35, at 88.
37 Id.; Kurt S. Wilhelm, Risk Management of Credit Derivatives, in PROFESSIONAL'S
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT 307, 338-39 (Lev Brodsky & Marc Lore,
eds. 2000).
GOODHART ET AL., supra note 35, at 88.
3' RICHARD ZHOU, COUNTERPARTY RISK SUBJECT To ATE 1 (2011), available at
http://mysite.verizon.net/zhou257/ATE_CVAI.pdf ("Counterparty credit risk re-
fers to the risk that a counterparty to a bilateral financial derivative contract may fail
to fulfill its contractual obligation causing financial loss to the non-defaulting par-
ty.").
40 More broadly, counterparty risk is a characteristic feature of over-the-counter
derivatives transactions. JON GREGORY, COUNTERPARTY CREDIT RISK: THE NEW
CHALLENGE FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 17 (2010); Michael Pykhtin & Steven H.
Zhu, A Guide to Modeling Counterparty Credit Risk GARP RISK REv., July-Aug. 2007, at
16, 16; see Eduardo Canabarro & Darrell Duffie, Measuring and Marking Counterparty
Risk, in ASSET/ LIABILITY MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 122, 122 (Leo M.
Tilman ed., 2003); Robert R. Bliss & Robert S. Steigerwald, Derivatives Clearing and
Settlement: A Comparison of Central Counterparties and Alternative Structures, 30 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 22, 23 (2006).
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C. Motivations for CRT
Market participants may be motivated to buy or sell credit risk
for a variety of reasons. The motive behind CRT transactions is rele-
vant to governance because how parties govern a transaction may de-
pend on whether its motivation is short-term or long-term oriented.
Parties that enter CRT transactions motivated by short-term goals are
likely less interested in CRT governance because good governance is
a long-term, costly commitment and losses from bad governance may
take place after a participant has exited or hedged the transaction, or
otherwise achieved its primary short-term purpose. The motivation
for a CRT transaction therefore may indicate whether it is well gov-
erned.
1. Financial and Economic
There are four primary financial or economic reasons why par-
ties may seek to transfer credit risk. First, risk management may mo-
tivate an institution to engage in CRT. For example, a credit risk
seller may no longer believe that exposure to the credit is economi-
cally desirable. A bank may transfer the credit risk associated with a
loan because the bank believes that the borrower is no longer as cre-
ditworthy as previously assessed or to avoid an overconcentration of a
particular type credit risk.4
Second, CRT may assist an institution in raising funds. For ex-
ample, selling assets through securitization may provide cheaper cap-
ital to a firm to the extent investors are more willing to invest in the
firm or an SPV due to the ability of securitization to produce more
desirable securities, reduce monitoring costs, or discipline manag-
42
ers.
Third, CRT may provide an institution with economic capital re-
lief. Economic capital is the amount of capital that a firm's internal
management determines is necessary to provide a cushion against
41 CHOUDHRY, supra note 32, at 409-13; VINOD KOTHARI, CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND
STRUCTURED CREDIT TRADING 26, 27 (2009). Transferring the interest rate risk associ-
ated with loans such as mortgages may also be a primary motivator in selling credit
assets. KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 101.
42 See CHOUDHRY, supra note 32, at 410; Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost
Sweetenerfor Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 1061, 1086-94 (1996); Edward M. acobucci &
Ralph A. Winter, Asset Securitization and Asymmetric Information, 34J. LEGAL STUD. 161,
171-93 (2005); Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 136, 143; Maciej F. Cuchra & Tim
Jenkinson, Security Design in the Real World: Why Are Securitization Issues
Tranched? 3-5 (July 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=676730.
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unexpected losses. 3 The general relationship between credit risk and
economic capital is that the greater the credit risk of a particular as-
set, the more economic capital must be held against the asset. By re-
ducing or eliminating the credit risk of a particular asset, CRT per-
mits a firm to decrease its economic capital and hence frees that
44
capital to be used for other purposes.
Fourth, CRT may be conducted as part of a long- or short-term
trading or investment strategy. A basic arbitrage trading strategy
stems from taking advantage of the relatively higher returns of long-
er-term credit assets compared to shorter-term ones. For example,
arbitrage CDOs are able to pay out less to investors than they take in
from collateral cash flows due to the basic economic principle of di-
versification.45 Typical short-term trading strategies include basis
trades that seek to profit from differences in spreads between cash in-
struments and the synthetic instruments that reference them, correla-
tion trades that use CDSs to take advantage of mispriced correlations
between securitization tranches, and delta hedging, which entails se-
46
curitization investors using CDSs to tailor their risk exposures.
2. Regulatory Capital Relief
Banks and other financial institutions may engage in CRT to ob-
tain the short-term benefit of reducing the level of capital that they
are required to hold by applicable capital regulations." Banks are
subject to capital regulation by national regulators implementing the
" JOHN B. CAOUETITE ET AL., MANAGING CREDIT RISK: THE GREAT CHALLENGE FOR
GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 349 (2008); KOTHARI, supra note 41, at 239.
44 CHOUDHRY, Supra note 32, at 410-11 (noting that securitization may lower eco-
nomic capital); KOTHARI, supra note 41, at 25 (noting that credit derivatives may low-
er economic capital).
'5 KOTHARI, supra note 41, at 186-87. CDOs are primarily entered into not for
regulatory capital relief or removing liabilities from balance sheets but for arbitrage
purposes. See Global CDO Issuance, SEC. INDUSTRY & FIN. MARKETS ASS'N,
http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/StatisticsFiles/SF-Global-
CDO-SIFMA.xls (last updated Apr. 12, 2012) (select the "Purpose" tab in the Excel
spreadsheet).
46 CHOUDHRY, supra note 32, at 222-24; BRIAN P. LANCASTER ET AL., STRUCTURED
PRODUCTS AND RELATED CREDIT DERIVATIVES: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE FOR INVESTORS
249-51 (2008); ATISH KAKODKAR, MERRILL LYNCH, CORRELATION TRADING: A NEW
ASSET CLASS EMERGES 9-11 (2003), available at
http://stat.fsu.edu/-mncube/FinancialMathEbooks/Correlation %20Trading.pdf.
" Other financial institutions subject to capital regulation include securities bro-
ker-dealers, insurance companies, government sponsored enterprises, such as Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, and any financial institution deemed systematically significant
by the U.S. Financial Stability Oversight Council. See MARKJICKLING & EDWARD V.
MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40249, WHO REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF
U.S. FINANcIAL SUPERVISION 12-14 (2010)
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Basel capital accord, 4 and pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, U.S.
banking regulators are implementing revised capital regulation
standards.4 9 The purpose of capital regulation is to promote the sol-
vency and stability of financial institutions. 50 Capital regulation im-
plementing Basel is generally "risk-based," which means that banks
with riskier assets must hold more capital.5 ' By transferring the risk of
its credit assets, CRT permits a bank to decrease its capital require-
ments, obtain regulatory capital relief, and potentially be more prof-
itable. This is true regardless of whether credit risk is transferred
52
with CDSs or through securitization.
On December 16, 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision released the most recent version of the Basel capital accord
(known as "Basel III") that will be implemented incrementally
through 2019.53 Compared to earlier versions of Basel, Basel III nar-
rows the definition of capital, increases capital requirements, and
imposes new requirements in regard to leverage, liquidity,
countercyclicality, and counterparty risk.54 Basel III generally reduces
the ability of banks to reduce regulatory capital through securitiza-
tions or through CDSs that are not cleared through a central coun-
terparty.55 Accordingly, engaging in CRT for short-term-oriented cap-
ital relief will likely be less of a motivation than prior to the financial
crisis.
4 CAOUETrE ETAL., supra note 43, at 362.
4 Govenor Daniel K. Tarullo, Dodd-Frank Implementation, BOARD GOvERNORS FED.
RES. SYS. (Dec. 6, 2011),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20111206a.htm.
51 See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capi-
tal Measurement and Capital Standards, A Revised Framework, Comprehensive Ver-
sion 2 (2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm.
"' Michael B. Gordy & Erik A. Heitfield, Risk-Based Regulatory Capital and Basel 11
358, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING 357, 358 (Allen N. Berger et al. eds.,
2010).
512 See CHOUDHRY, supra note 32, at 410-11 (noting that securitization may lower
regulatory capital); KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 24-25 (noting that credit derivatives
may lower regulatory capital).
" Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Frame-
work for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems 69, Annex 4 (2011), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf.
See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, supra note 53; see also Latham &
Watkins, Client Alert No. 1138, Basel III: A New Environment for International Banks,
LATHAM & WATKINS (Feb. 3, 2011), www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/eu-updates-
basel-iii.
" See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, supra note 53, at 3-4; see also
STANDARD & POOR's, TOUGHER CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER BASEL III COULD RAISE
THE COSTS OF SECURITIZATION (2010).
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3. Beneficial Accounting Treatment
Accounting rules may also make CRT more attractive. However,
an accounting improvement may neither reflect an actual economic
improvement nor identify the full risks to which a firm is exposed; it
may even mask a firm's financial deterioration. Accordingly, CRT
undertaken solely or primarily for the purpose of improving a credit
risk seller's accounting health may be motivated by short-term con-
siderations that come at the expense of longer-term and higher quali-
ty governance.
Because securitization involves the sale of credit assets to an SPV,
securitization results in accounting benefits to the seller, including
acquiring cash assets and being able to avoid any future losses associ-
ated with the securitized assets by removing them from the seller's
balance sheet. A fundamental accounting issue is the extent to
which the SPV's assets or liabilities must be consolidated with, and
hence reflected on, the balance sheet of the originator, issuer, ser-
vicer, or other party involved in the securitization. This is because in
a securitization transaction, the originator, issuer, servicer, or other
party often retains some type of control, risk, or other interest in the
credit assets transferred to the SPV, and as a result may be required
to consolidate. 57
Accounting standards in effect for financial statements filed pri-
or to 2010 did not make it exceptionally difficult for securitizations to
achieve off-balance-sheet treatment and hence not have their associ-S 58
ated assets and liabilities be consolidated. For fiscal years beginning
after November 15, 2009, revised accounting standards implemented
a qualitative test (based on control of, and economic exposure to, the
SPV), making it substantially more difficult to achieve off-balance-
sheet treatment for most securitization transactions. 9 As a result, a
significant amount of securitized assets were consolidated with finan-
51 See KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 767-68, 790.
57 Id. at 768.
5' See id. at 772-75, 783-90.
" CAROL A. HITSELBERG & JASON H.P. KRATTr, MAYER BROWN, BIG CHANGES TO
SECURITIZATION ACCOUNTING (2009), available at
http://www.rnayerbrown.com/publications/Big-Changes-to-Securitization-
Accounting-06-22-2009/; JOHN KOHLER, 12TH STREET CAPITAL, FASB 166 AND 167
IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITIZATION (2009), available at
http://www.senseoncents.com/wpcontent/uploads/2009/11 /FASB_166__167.pdf;
see also MARTY ROSENBLATI' ET AL., DELOITTE, SECURITIZATION ACCOUNTING: THE INS
AND OUTS (AND SOME Do's AND DON'TS) OF FAS 166, 167, AND COUNTING... 4-28
(2010).
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cial institutions' balance sheets.60 Requiring securitization transac-
tions to be consolidated on a credit risk seller's balance sheet may
make securitizations less attractive to banks and other risk sellers be-
cause, among other consequences, accounting consolidation may in-
crease the risk seller's balance sheet liabilities or require it to hold
S 61
additional capital.
CDSs are on-balance-sheet instruments that must be marked to
market at their fair value with any corresponding increase in coun-
terparty risk recorded as an unrealized loss on the income state-
ment.6 ' In addition, accounting rules applicable to financial state-
ments issued after 2008 require substantial qualitative and
quantitative disclosures from buyers of credit risk with CDSs (i.e.,
CDS protection sellers) .1 Nonetheless, transferring credit risk with a
CDS may have a salutary effect from an accounting perspective and
hence may be undertaken for short-term benefits. First, transferring
credit risk with a CDS may permit a credit-risk seller to book immedi-
ate, upfront gains through a "negative basis trade." Under such a
trade, if the payment the credit-risk seller makes to the credit-risk
buyer is lower than the payment the risk seller receives from being
exposed to the referenced credit asset, then the risk seller can book
the difference as an upfront profit. 4 In addition, using a CDS to
transfer credit risk can help a firm reduce volatility in its income
6' BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON RISK
RETENTION 68-70 (2010), available at
http://federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/securitization/riskretention.pdf.
"' Id. at 72-73; Letter from Mortgage Bankers Ass'n to Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys. 3 (Oct. 7, 2010), available at
http://www.mbaa.org/files/Advocacy/2010 /MBALettertoFederalReserveonRiskRete
ntionStudy.pdf.
62 KOTHARI, supra note 41, at 399, 402-07.
See generally ROTHSTEIN KASS, SFAS 161 (ASC 815-10-50), DISCLOSURES ABOUT
DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND HEDGING ACTIVITIES: IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE FOR
THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT COMMUNITY (2009) (describing the enhanced disclo-
sures required for derivatives under SFAS 161).
See J.P. MORGAN, SINGLE NAME CDS OF ABS 3-5 (2005), available at
http://www.securitization.net/pdf/JPMorgan/abcds_7MarO5.pdf (explaining nega-
tive basis trades in both cash and synthetic securitization structures); JANET TAVAKOLI,
STRUCTURED FINANCE AND COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
CASH AND SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATION 348-49 (2008); Nicoletta Kotsianas, CDS Negative
Basis Trading Jitters Hit Market, CREDIT INV. NEWS, Feb. 18, 2008, at 10; Philip Alexan-
der, Securitization Strategy Rethink, BANKER (Dec. 1, 2008),
http://www.thebanker.com/Markets/Derivatives-Structured-Products/Securitisation-
strategy-rethink?ct=true; Craig Stein & David Aron, Negative Basis Trade Basics,
DERIVATIVES WEEK (Nov. 17, 2006),
http://www.derivativesweek.com/Article/1252065/NegativeBasisTradeBasics_.ht
ml.
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statements. If a CDS is used to hedge another credit asset, then the
mark-to-market gains and losses for each instrument offset each other
in the income statement and reduce income volatility under an ac-
counting principle known as "hedge accounting."' 5
III. CRT GOVERNANCE
As a species of corporate governance theory, creditor govern-
ance theory seeks to understand the problems that creditors have in
receiving an appropriate return on their investment and the govern-
ance mechanisms creditors employ to mitigate such problems. The
principles of creditor governance help identify which governance
mechanisms reduce agency costs based upon the characteristics of
particular credit transactions. Because CRT governance is a type of
creditor governance, identifying the principles of creditor govern-
ance can provide a framework for good CRT governance.
A. Creditor Governance
Credit risk is a primary economic concern of creditors." Credit
risk is also a governance concern because of the presence of asym-
metric information and potentially misaligned incentives in the credi-
tor-debtor relationship.6' Asymmetric information and misaligned
incentives create agency costs, which are the costs that principals and
agents incur because their interests may diverge. 68 Agency costs be-
tween creditors and debtors generally take the form of adverse selec-
tion, moral hazard, and other forms of opportunism and shirking by
debtors."" Particular agency costs include debtors increasing their
overall risk after obtaining credit or taking on additional debt obliga-
• 70
tions that reduce their ability to repay existing creditors. To reduce
15 See Accounting for Derivatives Instruments and Hedging Activities, Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1998);
KOTHARI, supra note 41, at 399-406.
66 Creditors are also typically concerned about the market value of their invest-
ment in secondary markets.
67 See Whitehead, Debt Governance, supra note 15, at 68.
" See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-10 (1976).
69 Adverse selection takes place when informational asymmetries increase the
propensity of low quality borrowers to obtain credit because lenders are unable to
distinguish between low and high quality borrowers. Kiff et al., supra note 11, at 110.
Moral hazard occurs when a lender's lack of knowledge over a borrower's credit risk
permits the borrower to engage in opportunistic behavior that benefits itself at the
expense of the lender after the borrower obtains credit. Id.
70 See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. &Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting, 7J. FIN.
ECON. 117, 118-19 (1979).
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or eliminate these agency costs of debt, creditors adopt creditor gov-
ernance mechanisms.
There are five general creditor governance mechanisms. The
most basic creditor governance mechanism is demanding a certain
rate of interest to discipline a debtor and compensate creditors for
the risks associated with the agency costs of debt. Attempting to miti-
gate agency costs through interest rates is typically not sufficient,
however, due to informational asymmetries that prevent optimal
credit pricing. Accordingly, creditors may adopt four additional gov-
ernance mechanisms: monitoring, covenants, collateralization, and
CRT. Monitoring activities by creditors, including screening potential
debtors before credit is extended, are ubiquitous.71 Creditors also
routinely employ contractual constraints by enforcing and negotiat-
72ing debt covenants. Debt covenants may place significant con-
straints on debtors, including restricting their ability to take on addi-
tional debt, use cash flows, and make investment decisions.73
Covenants may also place performance requirements on debtors,S 74
thereby serving as an early warning signal to creditors. A covenant
breach permits creditors to accelerate the full amount of the loan;
however, in practice, creditors to corporate debtors typically renego-
tiate covenants when they are breached.7" Securing a loan with col-
76lateral helps reduce potential losses to creditors and can also serve
77
as a valuable signaling or screening device. CRT is a creditor gov-
ernance mechanism because using CRT to trade credit risk in sec-
ondary markets leads to credit risk price discovery that may discipline
debtors and help creditors in their monitoring activities.8
7 XAVIER FREIXAS &JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, THE MICROECONOMICS OF BANKING 29
(2d. ed. 2008); Tung, supra note 15, at 125-27, 139.
72 See generally Greg Nini et al., Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and
Firm Value, 92J. FIN. ECON. 400 (2009) (examining the role of creditors in corporate
governance).
7' Tung, supra note 15, at 136-38.
74 George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate
Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 1073, 1093-94 (1995).
75 Nini et al., supra note 15, at 2.
7' Tung, supra note 15, at 145 n.132
77 See Gabriel Jimrnez et al., Determinants of Collateral 32 (EFA 2004 Maastricht
Meetings, Working Paper No. 1455, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=565343.
78 Whitehead, Evolution of Debt, supra note 15, at 129-30. Secondary market pric-
ing of credit risk includes not only the price of credit instruments in secondary mar-
kets but also the price of CDSs that reference such instruments.
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The characteristics of a transaction determine which creditor
79
governance mechanisms are best suited to reduce its agency costs.
Important characteristics of credit transactions include the debtor's
risk, the cost of obtaining information about the debtor, and the ease
with which the transaction's credit risk can be transferred. The fol-
lowing principles identify how creditor governance mechanisms gen-
erally interact with transaction characteristics to reduce agency costs:
* Interest rates are higher the greater the risk of the debt-
so
or.
* Monitoring is less active the higher the monitoring costs
or the lower the risk of the debtor.8
* Covenants are more stringent the higher the monitoring
812
costs or the risk of the debtor.
* More collateral is used the higher the monitoring costs
or the risk of the debtor.83
* CRT is more likely to be used the more robust the in-
strument's market and trading infrastructure.
Two additional principles also explain the use of particular cred-
itor governance mechanisms. First, creditor governance mechanisms
may be substitutes. Accordingly, any given mechanism may be em-
ployed less to the extent other substitute mechanisms are used. For
example, creditors may engage in less monitoring or have less strin-
gent covenants when CRT is cheaper (e.g., the easier it is to exit a
loan through a loan sale). Second, less governance may take place to
the extent external factors reduce the benefits of governance. These
external factors include reliance on third parties (such as credit rat-
" See Oliver E. Williamson, Univ. of Cal., Berkely Transaction Cost Economics:
The Natural Progression, Nobel Prize Lecture 465 (Dec. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economics/laureates/ 2009/williamsonle
cture.pdf ("[T]ransactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with govern-
ance structures . . . so as to effect a (mainly) transaction cost economizing out-
come.").
80 Indeed, the very existence of debt and its requirement to make fixed, periodic
interest payments may serve as a check on managerial opportunism. Milton Harris &
Artur Raviv, Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt, 45 J. FIN. 321, 321-24
(1990).
81 See Whitehead, Debt Governance, supra note 15, at 69.
82 Id. For example, private bank loans have more stringent covenants than public
bonds in part because less information is generally available about non-public bor-
rowers.
83 Tensie Steijvers & Wim Voordeckers, Collateral and Credit Rationing: A Re-
view of Recent Empirical Studies as a Guide for Future Research, 23 J. ECON. SURVS.
924, 927 (2009).
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• 84ing agencies) to assess credit risk, explicit or implicit governmental
guarantees to creditors, a macroeconomic oversupply of credit, a
87
creditor's privileged status under bankruptcy law, or a creditor's
short-term orientation.
B. Market Infrastructure
CRT market infrastructure is comprised of the general charac-
teristics of CRT instruments and the instruments' secondary market
characteristics. Market infrastructure has an important impact on
overall financial market quality as measured by criteria such as liquid-
ity, efficiency, price discovery, and stability."' Market infrastructure
mechanisms also play a role in CRT governance because they can
help or hinder other governance mechanisms or may serve as a sub-
stitute for such mechanisms. Market infrastructure influences the
scope of control that parties have over transactions and the sensitivity
of particular CRT instruments to credit risk losses.
1. Contract Characteristics
Three important characteristics of CRT contracts include the
degree to which the contracts are standardized, complex, and trans-
parent as to the underlying credit instruments whose credit risk is
transferred. The standardization of CRT contracts can range from
highly customized bespoke transactions to relatively standardized
contracts. Customized CRT instruments have the benefit of being
able to transfer the precise credit risk the seller wants to transfer
while giving the risk buyer customized risk exposure. Customized
84 See infra note 344 and accompanying text.
'5 See Robert L. Hetzel, Too Big to Fail: Origins, Consequences, and Outlook, FED. RES.
BANK RICHMOND ECON. REv., Nov. -Dec. 1991, at 11. ("Too big to fail .... limits
incentives for creditors to monitor the riskiness of bank asset portfolios."); see also Di-
ana Hancock & Wayne Passmore, An Analysis of Government Guarantees and the Func-
tioning of Asset-Backed Securities Markets 2 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2010-
46, 2010) ("[Securitization] investors are more likely to rely on implicit government
guarantees .. .rather than to conduct a painstaking quantitative analysis of the un-
derlying collateral.").
16 Tung, supra note 15, at 161. For example, the global credit glut from 2003 to
2007 led to competition among lenders that reduced reliance on stringent covenants
in the form of covenant-light loans (those with little or no covenants). See Viral V.
Acharya et al., Private Equity: Boom and Bust?, 19J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 44, 44-46 (2007).
7 See MarkJ. Roe, The Derivatives Market's Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accel-
erator, 63 STAN. L. REv. 539, 560-64 (2011); Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in
a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARv. L. REv. 1151, 1200-01 (2010).
s8 LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR
PRACTITIONERS 4 (2002).
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CRT contracts, however, by nature, lack the standardization necessary
to be traded on an exchange or cleared by a central counterparty.89
In terms of complexity, CRT instruments range from relatively
straightforward loan assignment agreements that effect a loan sale di-
rectly from the credit risk seller to the credit risk buyer to a grouping
of lengthy securitization documents that establish and/or define for
several parties, among other things, an intermediary SPV firm that
purchases assets from a credit risk buyer, the terms of the manage-
ment of the SPV, and the liabilities that transfer the credit risk to the
buyers. Finally, CRT instruments have a wide range of disclosure and
reporting practices regarding the underlying credit instruments
whose risk is being transferred.
2. Secondary CRT Market Infrastructure
The important aspects of secondary CRT market trading infra-
structure are market liquidity, price and volume transparency, and
post-trade clearing and settlement. CRT instruments exist on a spec-
trum of liquidity, which is the ability of instruments to be traded
without suffering significant price discounts. 0 Some instruments may
be highly illiquid either due to contractual provisions limiting their
transfer to third parties or because their terms are so unique and
complex that they are difficult to value. Less complicated and
opaque CRT instruments may be relatively liquid and perhaps even
more liquid than bonds. A benefit of standardized CRT instruments
is their relatively high liquidity.
9
'
The transparency of CRT instrument prices and volume can
come in various forms when they are traded in secondary markets.
There is pre-trade transparency, which entails reporting information
about prospective trading interests such as bid/ask prices, and post-
trade transparency, which entails reporting information about price
and trading volume after the trading occurs. This information can be
89 See G.D. Koppenhaver, Derivative Instruments: Forwards, Futures, Options, Swaps,
and Structured Products, in FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: PRICING AND RISK MANAGMENT 3, 18
(Robert W. Kolb & James Overdahl eds., 3d ed. 2003); INT'L SWAPs & DERIJ\ATVES
Ass'N, TREAsuRY's PROPOSAL MANDATING CLEARING OF "STANDARDIZED" SwAPs 2-3
(2009).
90 Liquidity has four dimensions. Hendrik Bessembinder & William Maxwell,
Transparency and the Corporate Bond Market, 22J. ECON. PERSP. 217, 225 (2008).
" Nonetheless, even the most standardized CRT contracts are generally less
standardized than exchange-traded instruments such as stocks or futures instru-
ments, which differ only in price. Clearing Standardized OTC Derivatives: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Institutions, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 4 Exhibit 1 (2009) (testimony of Christian A.
Johnson, Professor, S.J. Quinney Coll. of Law, The Univ. of Utah).
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reported publicly or privately, in real-time or on a delayed basis, and
for individual transactions or in the aggregate.
Greater transparency may increase or decrease liquidity. On the
one hand, more transparent instruments tend to be more liquid be-
cause more information about their pricing makes market partici-
pants more interested in the instruments and more confident about92
their ability to sell the instruments if the need arises. On the other
hand, greater transparency may reduce bid/ask spreads, which in
turn causes the dealers of the instruments to reduce their trading
volume (or exit the market) and hence reduces the market's depth
and other aspects of market liquidity."
After a trade is executed, it must be cleared and settled to fully
discharge the legal obligations of the trading counterparties. 94 Clear-
ing and settlement can take place bilaterally, between trading coun-
terparties, or through an intermediary clearinghouse, which may be
part of an exchange. Clearing refers to the myriad of activities and
processes designed to ensure that financial contract counterparties
perform their obligations from the time a trade is executed until final
legal settlement. 5 Clearing includes confirming the parties to and
terms of a contract, determining and settling periodic payments,
evaluating the collateral, monitoring the creditworthiness of coun-
terparties, determining whether a credit event took place, and
whether to exercise closeout rights.96 OTC derivative transactions, in-
cluding CDSs, are generally cleared and settled bilaterally, while the
utilization of a central counterparty for clearing and settlement is a
characteristic of exchanged-traded instruments. 97
C. CRT Governance and Creditor Governance
CRT governance should be viewed as a type of creditor govern-
ance. First, CRT instruments have the same basic economic structure
as credit instruments. CRT instruments give their owners rights to
cash flows while exposing them to credit risk-just like loans and
92 See ISDA, TRANSPARENCY AND OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES 6 (2009).
" Id. at 7. Increased transparency may also increase market volatility and de-
crease stability. Id. at 7-8.
Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 40, at 22.
See generally ED NOSAL & ROBERT STEIGERWALD, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI., WHAT
is CLEARING AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT? (2010), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital-assets/publications/chicago-fed-letter/2010/cfl
september2010_278.pdf (providing a detailed discussion of clearing).
" Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 40, at 24.
17 Id. at 23.
1032 [Vol. 42:1009
CREDIT RISK TRANSFER GOVERNANCE
bonds. Second, CRT relationships suffer from informational asym-
metries and incentive misalignments similar to those of credit in-
struments generally. In the context of CRT, adverse selection may
take the form of credit risk sellers selling the risk of relatively low
quality assets.98 In addition, the very ability to transfer credit risk may
create moral hazard by causing originators and other credit risk
sellers to reduce their monitoring and screening of loans and other
credit assets whose risk is ultimately sold to others.9  Accordingly, in-
formational asymmetries and misaligned incentives give rise to CRT
agency costs and hence create governance problems."°° Third, in re-
sponse to CRT governance problems, market participants adopt gov-
ernance mechanisms similar to those for traditional credit instru-
ments, including the rates on interest-like payments charged to credit
risk sellers, screening and monitoring, collateralization, and cove-
nants.
Thus, CRT governance should be regarded as a specific type of
creditor governance such that the principles of creditor governance
apply to CRT instruments as well. The following two Parts of this Ar-
ticle detail the governance problems and mechanisms of unfunded
CDS transactions and funded securitizations, respectively. These
Parts conclude by identifying good CRT governance regimes for each
type of transaction based on the characteristics of the transactions
and their respective market infrastructures.
IV. UNFUNDED CRT: CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
A CDS is a contract in which a credit risk seller (the "protection
buyer") agrees to make an upfront payment along with periodic pre-
mium paymentsl° ' to a credit risk buyer (the "protection seller"). In
exchange, the credit risk buyer (protection seller) agrees to pay the
risk seller if a negative "credit event" in relation to a reference debt
obligation or a reference entity takes place. ° 2 Credit events typically
include a default, bankruptcy, or another failure to pay associated
98 Kiffet al., supranote 11, at 113.
See id. at 110.
'o Cf Oliver Hart, Corporate Governance, Some Theory and Applications, 105 ECON.J.
687 (1995) (arguing that governance issues arise whenever there are agency prob-
lems irresolvable by ex-ante contracting).
.0 Under standardized terms, these premium payments are one percent for in-
vestment-grade credits and five percent for sub-investment-grade credits.
"92 This description of a "typical" CDS agreement is based upon contract conven-
tion changes adopted in 2009. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 32, at 138-41. One basis
point is equal to one hundredth of a percentage so that, for example, seventy-five ba-
sis points equal 0.75% of the notional value of the bond.
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with the reference obligation or entity.0 3 If a credit event occurs, the
party making the periodic payments (the risk seller) is entitled to re-
ceive a cash payment in an amount equal to the loss incurred due to
the credit event, such as the diminished market value of the refer-
ence debt obligation. ' A CDS accordingly transfers credit risk and
hence is an instrument of CRT.
10 5
CDSs are classified broadly by the type of obligation or entity
they reference, and different types of CDSs typically have unique
terms associated with that type of CDS. The two most common types
of CDSs are single-name CDSs and CDS indices that reference corpo-
rate bonds.'0 A single-name CDS references a single bond or a single
reference entity. CDS indices typically reference 125 reference enti-
ties that have some common theme, such as all being American or
European investment-grade companies. 1°' CDSs that reference sover-
eign debt make up nearly twenty percent of the CDS market, while
CDSs that reference loans or the debt issued in securitizations (i.e.,
asset-backed securities) constitute approximately two percent of the
market.108
CDSs are different from credit insurance and guarantees for sev-
eral reasons. Unlike CDSs, credit insurance and guarantee contracts
each require the protection buyer to own the interest that is being in-
sured or the asset that is being guaranteed. °0 CDSs are also far more
standardized and liquid than either credit insurance contracts or
guarantees."0 A CDS is a type of OTC derivatives contract, which is
an instrument that is not traded on an organized exchange. OTC
derivatives come in a wide variety of forms, and different types trans-
fer different risks, such as interest rate risk or foreign exchange rate
risk. Single-name CDSs are regulated under U.S. law by the Securi-
'o' See KOTHARI, supra note 41, at 85-88.
104 See CHOUDHRY, supra note 32, at 129-31.
05 A CDS may also be used to transfer the counterparty risk of either party to a
CDS transaction by requiring a protection seller to pay an amount equal to any loss
that may arise due to the default of the protection buyer's counterparty on a separate
derivatives transaction. This transaction is known as a contingent CDS. GREGORY,
supra note 40, at 258-60; KOTHARI, supra note 41, at 122-24.
'0o E. PAUL RowADY, JR., TABB GROUP, THE GLOBAL RISK TRANSFER MARKET:
DEVELOPMENTS IN OTC AND EXcHANGE-TRADED DERIVATIVES 69, 71 (2010).
,07 BRIAN P. LANCASTER ET AL., STRUCTURED PRODUCTS AND RELATED CREDIT
DERIVATIVES: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE FOR INVESTORS 240-44 (2008); Mengle, supra
note 128, at 3.
... ROWADY, supra note 106, at 71.
... See KOTHARI, supra note 41, at 22.
110 Id.
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ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) as security-based swaps, and
the major CDS indices are regulated by the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission (CFTC)."'
A. Parties and Incentives
Every CDS contract involves a protection buyer (the credit risk
seller) and a protection seller (the credit risk buyer). CDSs may also
be traded on an electronic platform and/or be centrally cleared
through a clearinghouse (central counterparty).
The incentive of a CDS protection buyer is to pay as little as pos-
sible for the protection by minimizing the upfront payment and to
make as few payments as possible to the protection seller before a
credit event, if any, occurs, thereby paying the minimum for the pro-
tection. When a credit event does occur, all things being equal, the
protection buyer seeks the largest payment possible from the protec-
tion seller.1 12 A protection buyer also wants a protection seller to col-
lateralize the trade with as much high-quality collateral as possible to
ensure payment if a credit event occurs. In addition, a protection
buyer has an incentive to post as little collateral as possible at the out-
set of the trade and over its life to avoid the costs of doing so. The
basic incentives for the protection seller are opposite to the incen-
tives for the protection buyer. A protection seller wants to receive as
much as possible in payments from the protection buyer without
making any credit event-triggered payments.
In most CDS transactions, a CDS dealer constitutes at least one
of the parties," 3 which means that end-users of CDSs, such as hedge
funds and insurance companies, typically do not enter into CDS
agreements directly with one another. Dealers are usually on one
side of the trade because dealers stand ready to enter into CDS trades
with end-users and have the capabilities and operational infrastruc-
. SEC Adopts Rule Defining Swaps-Related Terms for Regulating Derivatives, SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-
67.htm; Testimony Before the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
Washington, DC, CFC Chairman Gary Gensler, U.S. COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING
COMMISSION (May 22, 2012),
http://cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-1 14.
112 In physically settled CDSs, the protection buyer has an incentive to deliver the
cheapest deliverable asset that will satisfy the buyer's delivery obligations to the pro-
tection seller.
.3 Marco Avellaneda & Rama Cont, Transparency in the Credit Default Swap
Markets 9 (July 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.isda.org/c-and-a/pdf/CDSMarketTransparency.pdf.
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ture to help manage risk and make the transaction efficient."4 In ad-
dition, most CDS transactions take place between CDS dealers as part
of their risk-management activities. " 5 A CDS dealer obtains income
from the difference between bid/ask spreads on particular CDSs-
from selling instruments at a higher price than purchased."' This
creates two fundamental incentives for dealers. First, dealers have an
incentive to increase their trading volume to increase their profits
from order flow."7 Second, dealers have an incentive to maximize
the bid/ask spread on any given CDS contract to increase profits per
trade. Generally, bid/ask spreads are higher when contracts are less
standardized or there is less price transparency.' 8 The profits that
dealers earn from bid/ask spread differentials may serve as a capital
cushion to reduce risk from counterparty defaults. This implies that
a reduction in CDS bid/ask spreads may increase counterparty risk.
CDS trades may utilize the services of a central counterparty
clearinghouse (CCP) for several post-trade execution activities, which
otherwise may take place bilaterally between the trading counterpar-
ties.' 19 If used, a CCP becomes the buyer to the seller and the seller to
buyer through a novation with each party.12 A CCP thereby fulfills its
fundamental purpose by removing counterparty risk from each of the
CDS counterparties and taking it on itself. An instrument must be
sufficiently liquid and standardized to be centrally cleared.12 A signif-
icant yet minority of CDSs, such as certain single-names and indices,
are suitable for central clearing.122 CCPs may be operated on a for-
profit basis or through mutual structure in which CCP users are also
... CHRISTOPHER L. CULP, THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS: BUSINESS STRATEGY AND
TACTICS 510 (2001).
11 DARRELL DUFFIE, How BIG BANKS FAIL AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 17 (2010);
Matthew Leising, CME Group, Citadel Said to Lack Credit-Default Swap Customers,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Mar. 19, 2009, 14:00 EDT),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a4LBDf2UtsEE&refer
=home (reporting that according to the Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., "[b]anks
trading with other banks accounted for 80 percent of all [CDS] trades in the week
ended March 13, [2009]"). When dealers trade between themselves, often the ser-
vices of a third-party interdealer broker are utilized. ROBERT W. KOLB & JAMES A.
OVERDAHL, FUTURES, OPTIONS, AND SWAPS 676 (2007).
16 See ROBERT W. KOLB &JAMES A. OVERDAHL, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 186 (2003);
SALIH N. NEFrcI, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 488-99 (2008).
117 HARRIS, supra note 88, at 278-79, 282-83.
KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 116, at 186.
19 The activities of a CCP are additionally described infra Part IV.C.5.
10 DAVID STOWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND
PRIVATE EQUITY: THE NEW PARADIGM 134 (2010).
121 See EUR. CENT. BANK, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AND COUNTERPARTY RISK 79 (2009).
122 Id.
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123
the owners. As part of their overall risk management practices,
CCPs have an incentive to limit membership only to dealers that can
afford to meet certain capital and other requirements. A dealer-
owned CCP may require non-member dealers and end-users to pay
fees to clear trades through dealer-members.
124
B. Governance Problems
1. Counterparty Risk
A CDS contract creates a counterparty relationship and hence is
laden with counterparty risk, regardless of whether the trade is purely
bilateral or centrally cleared. Protection buyers and sellers are each
vulnerable to the risk of being exposed to a counterparty with highly
concentrated CDS positions. 125 Both counterparties are also exposed
to operational governance problems that arise from attempting to
manage and bear the costs of participating in numerous CDS
trades. 2" Governance problems may also arise from a lack of proper
documentation or legal uncertainty regarding the enforceability of
counterparty payments, including the amount of payment owed or
127
whether a credit event has taken place. All of these governance
problems may also exist at the intrafirm level, where the purchase or
sale of CDSs by a company's affiliates or its subsidiaries puts the relat-
ed organization at risk.
2. Protection Buyers (Credit Risk Sellers)
For protection buyers, unfunded transactions suffer from a basic
incentive misalignment: a protection seller has an incentive to sell too
much protection and earn periodic spread payments even though the
protection seller may not be able to make a credit-event-triggered
payout due to the high correlation between the credit event and the
12 See generally Douglas D. Evanoff et al., Policymakers, Researchers, and Practitioners
Discuss the Role of Central Counterparties, 30J. ECON. PERSP. 8 (2006).
124 Collin Barr, Justice Warns on Wall Street Trading Cartel, CNN MONEY (Dec. 29.
2010, 1:27 PM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2010/12/29/justice-warns-on-wall-
street-trading-cartel.
115 Systemic Risk: Regulatory Oversight and Recent Initiatives to Address Risk Posed by
Credit Default Swaps: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Institutions & Gov-
ernment Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., I1Ith Cong. 14-15 (2009)
(statement of Orice M. Williams, Dir., Fin. Mkts. & Cmty. Inv.).
126 EUR. CENT. BANK, supra note 121, at 42; KOTHAi, supra note 41, at 349-50.
127 See JAN JOB DE VRIEs ROBBE ET AL., SECURITIZATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE
FACE OFTHE CREDIT CRUNCH 123-27 (2008).
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creditworthiness of the protection seller.12' AIG's exposure to $61.4
billion worth of CDSs tied to mortgage-related securities is a notori-
ous example of such a phenomenon.1 9 A protection buyer may be
doubly at a loss where the reference asset or entity and the protec-
tion seller default jointly. These governance issues are exacerbated
to the extent that a protection seller has a highly concentrated expo-
sure to the same reference asset or entity but in regard to other buy-
ers.
Protection buyers may also face moral hazard when protection
sellers increase their risk profile once they sell credit risk protec-130
tion. Even if a payout does take place, a protection buyer exposed
to the risk of the reference asset may not be fully compensated be-
cause there is a mismatch between the specific risk the credit risk
buyer is exposed to and the actual risk that the CDS protects
against. ' Another governance problem for protection buyers stems
from an accounting issue; if the protection seller's creditworthiness
decreases, the buyer may have to write down the value of hedges pro-
vided by the CDS to reflect an increased likelihood that the seller will
not be able to meet its obligations.
1
31
3. Protection Sellers (Credit Risk Buyers)
A primary governance problem for a protection seller is the de-
fault by the protection buyer that deprives the seller of an expected
income stream. In such a case, the protection seller will have to mark
down the value of the CDS on its balance sheet and take an income
loss.'" Another governance problem for a protection seller comes
from adverse selection, which may arise in the CDS context if protec-
.2 This basic incentive misalignment stems from the credit risk seller's own incen-
tive to take on "wrong way" or "double default" risk. See GREGORY, supra note 40, at
207; David Mengle, Credit Derivatives: An Overview, ECON. REv., 4TH Q. 2007, at 1, 2.
129 GREGORY, supra note 40, at xxiii; AIG, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 122 (Feb.
28, 2008).
30 Kiffet al., supra note 11, at 115.
"' This "basis risk" comes in several forms. See ROBBE ET AL., supra note 127, at
122; TAV\AKOLI, supra note 64, at 49.
132 See Erik Holm &Jesse Westbrook, N. Y Regulator Pushes Banks to Rescue Bond In-
surers (Update3), BLOOMBERG.COM (Jan. 24., 2008, 9:11 EST),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aVPJ2WgCKyw (re-
porting that by preventing downgrades of monoline insurance companies MBIA and
Ambac "[b]anks would avoid billions more in write-downs on the value of subprime
securities they had insured" in part with CDSs); see also Canabarro & Duffie, supra
note 40, at 128.
113 MARK ANSON ET AL., CREDIT DERIVATIVES: INSTRUMENTS, APPLICATIONS AND
PRICING 281 (2004).
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tion sellers cannot determine the true risk of reference assets so that
protection is purchased only on relatively higher risk assets. Howev-
er, adverse selection is much less likely to be an issue in the vast ma-
jority of CDS trades for which the reference assets are public compa-
ny bonds because information about such assets is widely available.
4. Central Counterparties
Using a CCP to clear CDS trades raises several governance prob-
lems. A fundamental problem occurs when a CCP is undercapital-
ized and hence unable to make due on its obligations to protection
sellers or protection buyers. A CCP may become undercapitalized
due to technical risk-management failures or because it reduces
members' capital requirements to attract their business. 134 Regulated
CCPs may also fail due to inadequate prudential supervision by regu-
lators or by benefiting from "too big to fail" governmental policies
and access to central bank liquidity facilities that implicitly subsidize
CCP risk taking.1
3 5
CCPs may also cause a reduction in counterparty risk-
management in the market. A CCP may create moral hazard by re-
moving the direct incentive for CDS counterparties to consider coun-
terparty risk upon entering a trade since that risk is shifted to the
•136
clearinghouse. In addition, clearing through a CCP may create an
adverse selection problem because dealers likely have better infor-137
mation about customized swaps than CCP risk managers. Having
multiple CCPs may also increase counterparty risk by reducing bilat-
eral netting across different OTC classes more than it increases the
opportunities for multilateral netting across a single type of deriva-
... SQUAM LAKE WORKING GRP. ON FIN. REGULATION, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS,
CLEARINGHOUSES, AND EXCHANGES 3--4 (2009), available at
www.cfr.org/content/ .../SquamLakeWorkingPaper5.pdf.
"5 Christopher L. Culp, OTC-Cleared Derivatives: Benefits, Costs, and Implications of
the "Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act," 20J. APP. FIN. 1, 23-24
(2010); see also Kirsi Ripatti, Central Counterparty Clearing: Constructing a Framework for
Evaluation of Risks and Benefits 20-24 (Bank of Fin., Research Discussion Paper No.
30, 2004).
13' Robert Hills et al., Central Counterparty Clearing Houses and Financial Stability, 6
FIN. STABILITYREv. 122, 128 (1999).
"' See Culp, supra note 135, at 20; Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Clearing in
Derivatives Markets: Netting, Asymmetric Information, and the Sharing of Default
Risks Through a Central Counterparty 33-38 (Jan. 8, 2009) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with Univ. of Houston Dep't of Fin.).
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tive.13 In addition, the potentially high costs associated with replac-
ing the CDS contract of a defaulted clearing member may lead to on-
ly relatively high-risk traders utilizing CCPs, thereby giving rise to
CCPs that have a relatively greater risk of insolvency.
3 9
C. Governance Mechanisms
1. Dealer Practices
Basic CDS governance mechanisms arise from the fact that, like
all other OTC swap markets, the CDS market is driven by dealers.
Although a CDS dealer may earn income from entering into a new
CDS trade, a dealer is in the market making business and does not
seek to take on the market risk associated with any particular posi-
tion. Accordingly, dealers seek to have a balanced book, which
means that, for every CDS trade a dealer enters, it also enters into an
offsetting trade that neutralizes the dealer's risk with respect to any
particular movements or credit events. Dealers' market-risk neu-
trality is a governance device for two reasons. First, it limits the in-
centive of dealers to take on very risky or highly complex trades for
which it may not be able to neutralize the risk of through an offset-
ting trade. In addition, when a credit event takes place, a dealer will
generally not bear any economic losses due to its own offsetting
trades. Dealers have concentration limits and thus generally do not
let exposure to any single counterparty go above pre-established lev-
els; they seek to diversify their counterparty risks. 4' Dealers also typi-
cally screen potential trading counterparties before entering into a
trade. 42 The services of an interdealer broker are often used to re-
" See Darrell Duffle & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce
Counterparty Risk? (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper
No. 46, 2011).
'39 Cyril Monnet, Let's Make It Clear: I-low Central Counterparties Save(d) the Day, Bus.
REV. 1ST Q. 2010, at 1, 6-7.
4 See The Role of Financial Derivatives in the Current Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition & Forestry, I10th Cong. 95 (2008) (statement of Richard
Lindsey, President and CEO, Callcott Group, LLC); DAVID MENGLE, ISDA, THE
IMPORTANCE OF CLOSE-OUT NETFING 3-4 (2010).
141 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-716, CREDIT DERIVATIVES:
CONFIRMATION BACKLOGS INCREASED DEALERS' OPERATIONAL RISKS, BUT WERE
SUCCESSFULLY ADDRESSED AFtERJOINT REGULATORY ACTION 15 (2007); GREGORY, supra
note 40, at 29.
142 See GEOFF CHAPLIN, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: TRADING, INVESTING, AND RISK
MANAGEMENT 41 (2010).
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duce the costs to dealers in finding trading counterparties, including
those counterparties with which to enter into offsetting trades 43
2. Netting
A second counterparty governance mechanism intended to deal
with the problem of large gross counterparty exposures is known as
netting. Netting is a process whereby counterparties cancel out mu-
tually offsetting CDS positions in order to manage only the net risk
between them. 44 Payment netting takes place during the life of a
CDS agreement and entails cancelling mutually offsetting daily cash
flows, which results in a single payable amount. 4 5 Close-out netting
takes place after a credit event occurs; the defaulting and the non-
defaulting parties determine how much is owed between them by ref-
erence to the replacement values of their offsetting contracts.4 6 Net-
ting reduces the overall amount of CDS contracts and gross risk ex-
posures without changing the underlying economic position of the
parties.4 7 Netting can take place between two counterparties on a bi-
lateral basis or multilaterally between two or more counterparties
with related counterparty exposures. Netting can substantially re-
duce gross exposures. For example, by the end of 2008 $30.2 trillion
in notional CDS value had been eliminated through multilateral net-
ting by major U.S. commercial bank-dealers. 4 9
3. Collateral
A third counterparty governance mechanism is using collateral150
in the form of cash or low-risk securities. When entering into a
CDS, a party typically posts an initial amount of collateral (the "inde-
pendent amount"), and the collateral is then adjusted on a daily or
' Avellaneda & Cont, supra note 113, at 10.
'41 See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 141, at 23; EUR. CENT. BANK,
supra note 121, at 42-44; Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, Derivatives and System-
ic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout 8-11 (Fed. Reserve Bank, Working Paper No.
2005-03), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital-assets/publications/working-papers/2005/wp20
05 03.pdf (describing netting).
"' MENGLE, supra note 140, at 2.
116 Id. at 2-3; see also GREGORY, supra note 40, at 46-53.
141 See MARKIT, THE CDS BIG BANG: UNDERSTANDING THE CHANGES TO THE GLOBAL
CDS CONTRACT AND NORTH AMERICAN CONVENTIONS 5-6 (2009), available at
http://www.markit.com/cds/announcements/resource/cds-big-bang.pdf.
148 GREGORY, supra note 40, at 53; EUR. CENT. BANK, supra note 121, at 44.
4 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC'S QUARTERLY REPORT
ON BANK TRADING AND DERnVATIVES ACTIVITIES FOURTH QUARTER 2008 4, 14 (2008).
F50 EUR. CENT. BANK, supra note 121, at 43.
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weekly basis by either party depending on the mark-to-market value
of their positions over time.151 The amount of collateral is not based
on a specific CDS position but is rather based on all OTC derivatives
transactions between the counterparties that are covered by the in-
dustry standard ISDA Master Agreement contract template.152 Posting
and subsequently adjusting collateral is typical for CDS counterpar-
ties, although sovereign users of CDS often do not post collateral.
5
1
Dealers typically do not post an independent amount on trades be-
tween each other but do collateralize their trades with variation mar-
gin.14 By contrast, hedge funds are typically required to post signifi-
cant amounts of collateral.
155
4. CDS Market Infrastructure
Another type of CDS counterparty governance mechanism is the
robust, high-tech, and rapidly developing CDS market infrastructure.
An important feature of CDS market infrastructure is that CDSs are
relatively liquid types of credit instruments-they are traded far more
often than corporate bonds, private bank loans, and securitized debt
instruments.' 5  CDS market infrastructure includes the substantial
contract standardization provided to CDS counterparties by the ISDA
Master Agreement and related forms.
CDS trading infrastructure also includes substantial CDS price
transparency. Pre-trade CDS pricing is available through interdealer
'5 Id. at 44-48.
52 Id. at 45.
'5' ISDA MARGIN SuRVr 2011, at 3 (2011), available at
https://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/surveys/margin-surveys ("[Ninety-
three] percent of all credit derivatives trades executed were subject to collateral ar-
rangements during 2010."); Duncan Wood, One-Way CSAs Pile Up Funding Risk for
Banks, RISK.NET (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.risk.net/risk-
magazine/feature/1 949147/-csas-pile-funding-risk-banks.
15' EuR. CENT. BANK, supra note 121, at 46; ISDA MARGIN SURVEY 2011, supra note
153, at 3 ("[Eighty] percent of all OTC derivatives transaction executed by the large
derivatives dealers were subject to collateral agreements.").
'5' ISDA MARGIN SURVEY 2011, supra note 153, at 14.
,"6 See Michael S. Gibson, Understanding the Risk of Synthetic CDOs 4 (Fed. Res. Bd.,
Working Paper No. 2004-36, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=596442
("Few corporate bonds trade more than twice a day. Loans trade even less frequent-
ly."); Dion Bongaerts, et al., Liquidity and Liquidity Risk Premia in the CDS Market 1
(May 28, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.erim.eur.nl/portal/page/portal/ERIM/ContentArea/Documents/liqu
idityand%201iquidityriskpremiaintheCDSmarket.pdf ("The CDS market has become
much more liquid than the corporate bond market.").
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brokers and by contacting dealers directly.157 Post-trade CDS prices
are generally available to the public for free through Markit5' and the
Depository Trust Clearing Corporation (DTCC)'59 and are widely re-
ported by the media.' 60 Subscription-based services for institutional
investors also provide post-trade CDS data through Bloomberg data
terminals and through private data vendors such as CMA, which of-
fers real-time pricing.1 6 1 Post-trade pricing is also available through
CCPs, and electronic trading platforms make both pre- and post-
162trade pricing available. Public companies typically disclose their
CDS exposures in their financial statements. 1' The DTCC also makes
164
comprehensive trade-level data available to regulators on-demand,
operates a CDS trade matching, confirmation, and settlement service,
and its warehouse facilitates similar or related services by other third
parties.' 65 Third parties also provide services to help CDS counterpar-
ties manage collateral, engage in netting, and reduce other forms of
risk, such as gap or basis risk, which arises when a CDS is not perfectly
matched with its underlying exposure.16
"7 Avellaneda & Cont, supra note 113, at 10; Eunice Bet-Mansour, On Price Trans-
parency of OTC Derivatives, I I PROFIT & Loss MAG. 20,21 (2010).
18 Free CDS Pricing Report, MARKIT,
http://www.markit.com/cds/most liquid/index.html (last visited May 27, 2012).
"' Trade Information Warehouse Reports, DTCC,
http://xvw.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/data/index.php (last visited May 27,
2012).
"0 See, e.g., Taejin Park, Bond Risk Climbs in Asia Ex-Japan, Credit-Default Swaps Show,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Apr. 19, 2012, 9:24 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
04-20/bond-risk-climbs-in-asia-ex-japan-credit-default-swaps-show.html.
161 Real-Time CDS Price Discovery, CMA, http://www.cmavision.com/products-
solutions/real-time-cds-price-discovery (last visited May 16, 2012).
162 Ass'N FOR FIN. MKTS. IN EUR., MIFID REvIEW-TRANSPARENCY IN CREDIT DEFAULT
SWAPS 1 (2010); The Role of a Swap Execution Facility, TRADEWEB (Nov. 25, 2011),
http://www.tradeweb.com/about/regulation/pending-reform.
16' EUR. CENT. BANK, supra note 121, at 29.
16 Judy Inosanto, DTCC Launches Portal to Give Global Regulators Access to CDS Data,
http://www.dtcc.com/news/newsletters/dtcc/201 I/mar/dtccjlaunches-portal.php
(last visited May 31, 2012).
5 Peter Madigan, Updated ISDA CDS Novation Process to Boost Efficiency While Mini-
mising Risk, RISK.NET (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.risk.net/risk-
magazine/news/i 730212/updated-isda-cds-novation-protocol-set-boost-efficiency-
minimising-risk; Lifecycle Event Processing, DTCC,
http://www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/suite/lifecycle-event-processing.php (last
visited May 16, 2012); Central Settlement, DTCC,
http://www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/suite/central-settlement.php (last visited
May 16, 2012).
"6 See Culp, supra note 135, at 7-8; Michael Mackenzie, Demand for Reducing CDS
Risk Grows, FT.COM (Feb. 14, 2011, 5:09 PM),
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5. Central Counterparties
To reduce problems associated with counterparty risk in general,
parties may utilize a CCP as a governance mechanism. A CCP may be
a higher quality counterparty than any particular dealer or end-user
because of its risk-management practices and aggregation of numer-
ous trades, which allows the CCP to reduce operational risk. A CCP's
primary governance mechanisms require each clearing member to
post collateral and meet creditworthiness qualifications, establish a
reserve fund to cover losses that a defaulting clearing member's col-
lateral does not, and mutualize losses among other clearing memberst" i 167
if losses are in excess of the CCP's reserve fund. CCPs may improve
operational efficiency by establishing consistent standards for meas-
uring what collateral must be posted or how much a party owes, re-
ducing the number of counterparties that clearing members must
monitor and interact with, and reducing the costs involved in manag-
ing the fallout from a clearing member's default.168 CCPs can also in-
crease transparency by centralizing and making pricing and other
trade data available. Finally, user-ownership of a CCP may help re-
duce CCP owners' incentive to decrease the clearinghouse's capitali-
zation for short-term gain and minimize other agency costs.169
The Dodd-Frank Act mandates that, upon a determination by
the SEC or CFTC, eligible CDSs must be centrally cleared and traded
on a regulated swap execution facility or be reported to a trade repos-
itory or an appropriate regulator."7 CDS dealers and other major
swap participants are also subject to heightened monitoring and reg-
ulation with respect to capital, reporting, business conduct, and other
matters.1 7 1 Commercial end-users of CDSs that are used for hedging
purposes are not subject to the mandatory clearing and trading re-
quirement.172
6. Unique Terms
CDSs that reference different types of underlying assets also typ-
ically have some unique terms that reflect the unique nature of the
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/70dbaOOe-3601-1 1e0-9b3b-
00144feabdcO.html#axzzlv4vkTlwL.
167 Culp, supra note 135, at 10; GREGORY, supra note 40, at 374-77.
1' Culp, supra note 135, at 15-18; GREGORY, supra note 40, at 377-79.
68 Evanoff et al., supra note 123, at 13.
170 WEIL GOTSHAL, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: AN OVERVIEW OF THE DODD-
FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION AcT 11-12 (2010).
' Id. at 13-14.
172 Id. at 12.
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transaction and serve as additional governance mechanisms. CDSs
that reference asset-backed securities, including CDOs, define credit
events, such as default and failure to pay, differently than corporate
CDSs by including a distressed ratings downgrade. 173 CDSs referenc-
ing CDOs also typically have the "pay-as-you-go" provision, which re-
quires a protection seller to make a payment to the protection buyer
if there is an express or implied write-down or a failure to pay with re-
_ 174
spect to the reference CDO tranche. The purpose of this template
was to overcome difficulties in settling transactions with illiquid ref-
erence obligations, such as CDOs.17 Notably, the effect of adopting a
strict pay-as-you-go mechanism is to mimic the credit risk of the un-
derlying CDO-and much of its associated volatility.1
7
1
D. Counterparty Governance: Conclusion and Summary Table
Good governance for unfunded CRT transactions should consist
of mechanisms that can reduce the bilateral nature of their agency
costs. Having such counterparty governance mechanisms driven by
the interests of intermediary derivatives dealers is likely efficient be-
cause dealers stand on both sides of transactions and therefore seek
to adopt mechanisms that benefit the market as a whole and not just
credit risk sellers or credit risk buyers separately. A counterparty
governance regime characterized by strong monitoring, collateraliza-
tion, and a robust market infrastructure is likely sufficient to substan-
tially reduce the agency costs of CDS transactions and thereby result
in good governance even without using clearinghouses or trading
platforms. The following table summarizes the primary governance
problems for unfunded CDS transactions and their corresponding
governance mechanisms:
7' KOTHARI, supra note 41, at 119; ROBBE ET AL., supra note 127, at 185-88.
171 Protection buyers must make the opposite payment if the shortfalls recover.
LAURIE S. GOODMAN ET AL., SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT DERIVATIVES 179-81 (2008).
An implied write-down takes place when the par value over-collateralization ratio is
below 100%. Id. at 180.
"' Id. at 139-40.
171 Id. at 140-41.
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Table 1: Unfunded CDS Governance Problems and
Counterparty Governance Mechanisms
V. FUNDED CRT: SECURITIZATION
Securitization is the process through which financial assets are
pooled together and structured to create debt securities that derive
177
their payments from the cash flows generated by the pooled assets.17
A defining feature of the securitization process is that the securitized
assets are not directly transferred from the originator to the purchas-
ers as in, for example, a sale of loans. Rather, in a securitization, a
separate firm known as an SPV acts as an intermediary and purchases
177 KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 4, 8-9; Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 133, 135.
Unfunded Governance Counterparty Governance
Problems Mechanisms
Protection Seller Default Collateralization, Screening, Concentra-
Protection Buyer Default tion Limitations, Trading
Dealer Default Balanced Book Operations, Collateraliza-
tion, Concentration Limitations, Trading
Unmanageable Gross Netting
Exposures
Other Operational Risks and General Effi- Contract Standardization, Trade Matching,
ciency Concerns Substantial Pre- and Post-Trade Price
Transparency, Gap-Risk Management
CCP Default Clearing Member Requirements, Margin,
Default Fund, Loss Mutualization
Low Recovery Value for Illiquid Reference Pay-as-You-Go Template
Assets
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the assets outright or gains exposure to their cash flows synthetically
by selling CDS protection referencing the assets. 17 The SPV, in turn,
issues securities backed by the assets' actual or synthetically derived
cash flows. 179 An SPV may be organized as a trust, LLC, special pur-
pose corporation, or other business form. 8 °
An important effect of securitization is that it typically separates
any risks that stem from the financial condition of the originator (or
other credit risk seller) from the SPV, thereby shielding the SPV's in-
vestors from such risks.1s' This separation includes protection of the
SPV's assets in case of the originator's bankruptcy, which means that
,,182the SPV is "bankruptcy-remote. Securitization effects risk separa-
tion in the other direction as well: SPV investors only have recourse
to the SPV's assets, and not to the originator's, to satisfy their
claims.g183
A common securitization structure is a pay-through structure,
which involves the issuance of debt securities to investors that entitle
them to payments of interest and principal at stated intervals.1 4 Im-
portantly, the timing of the payments for pay-through debt securities
is different than that of the cash flows generated by the SPV's assets.
While this allows a pay-through securitization to overcome mismatch-
es in the term structure of assets and liabilities, it requires payments
from the SPV's assets to be restructured to ensure timely payment of
the SPV's liabilities to investors1 85 In a pay-through structure, the lia-
bilities issued by the SPy typically have a shorter maturity than the
SPV's assets. A major exception is the securitization of credit card re-
ceivables or leases, which are of much shorter duration than the se-
curities issued by the SPV.' 6
"78 KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 8.
179 Id. at 15-16, 60, 75.
"o Id. 634-36; LANCASTER ET AL., supra note 46, at 177; ROBBt ET AL., supra note
127, at 16. For an analysis of trusts used for securitization and other purposes, see
generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: An Invitation
to Comparatists, 13 DuIKJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 321 (2003).
' Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 135-36.
112 STEPHEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURITIZATION 3-1 (3d ed. 2002) (2007).
KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 64-65.
84 Id. at 60, 76, 79-83.
s Id. at 60, 76, 84-86. The cash flows collected from the SPV's assets may be used
to pay off investors regularly, to reinvested, or be collected over time to pay off inves-
tors in a one-time bullet repayment. See id. at 227-28.
186 KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 91-92.
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Nearly any type of financial asset can be securitized, from auto
loans, credit card receivables, and equipment leases, to commercial
loans and bonds, to payments derived from intellectual propertyS 187
rights. The securities created from securitizations are referred to
generically as asset-backed securities.18 Originators involved in secu-
ritization can include any firm exposed to credit risk or credit-like
risk such as banks, mortgage and non-mortgage finance companies,
and issuers of credit cards and student loans. 89
A CDO is a securitization SPV whose assets consist solely of one
or more types of credit instruments, including commercial or mort-
gage loans, bonds, or distressed debt. '9° CDOs can also structure a re-
securitization when they are backed by asset-backed securities and
other CDOs. Often, when a CDO SPV purchases securities from an
SPV, they purchase the mezzanine (or middle risk) tranches."' An
important feature of securitization structures, including CDOs, is that
the debt securities issued by the SPV are issued in classes known as
tranches, which means that each class of securities has a different
priority claim to the SPV's cash flows.
1 92
Synthetic securitization combines CDSs with securitization. In-
stead of an SPV purchasing credit assets, as is the case in a cash secu-
ritization, an SPV in a synthetic securitization gains a right to credit
asset cash flows by selling CDS protection on such assets." 3 The SPV
obtains funding by selling debt securities (notes) to investors and us-
es those proceeds to pay the protection buyer, counterparty to the
SPV." 4 Synthetic securitization often takes the form of partially fund-
ed synthetic CDOs. In such a structure, investors sell CDS protection
directly to the holder of the reference assets and have to make a pro-
tection payout only if all of the funded tranches issued by the SPV are
wiped out.8  These unfunded "super senior" tranches greatly reduce
the cost of the transaction to the credit risk seller and, along with the
.87 Id. at 65.
1 KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 60. Unlike bonds and debentures, there is no fixed
maturity for ABS. See id. at 228.
18 ld. at 69-70.
Laurie S. Goodman et al., Cash-Collateralized Debt Obligations, in THE HANDBOOK
OF FIXED INCOME SECURITIES 669, 669 (7th ed. 2005).
I" KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 441.
,12 Id. at 218, 440.
183 KOTHARI, supra note 41, at 180.
'9 Id. at 181.
15 SVENJA HAGER, PRICING PORTFOLIO CREDIT DERIVATIVES BY MEANS OF
EVOLUTIONARYALGORrrHMS 14 (2008); KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 529-30.
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standardization of CDSs on CDOs, explain the rapid growth in syn-
thetic securitization until the financial crisis.
19 6
A. Parties and Incentives
The issues and challenges surrounding the governance of secu-
ritization are complex. This complexity arises primarily due to the
lengthy and multi-faceted nature of securitization provisions and the
numerous parties involved in a securitization transaction. The most
significant parties to a securitization transaction are the originator,
arranger, underwriter, servicer, trustee, manager, and credit ratings
agency. Depending on the type of the securitization transaction and
the particularities of its execution, these parties may play a different
or more significant role and may be part of the same firm.
In a securitization transaction, the originator is the party that
creates or owns the credit assets whose risk will ultimately be trans-
ferred to the SPV's investors. Typically, the originator originates the
credit assets by making loans, but the originator may also be securitiz-
ing credit assets it purchased.'97 An initial step in the securitization
process is to sell the credit assets to an SPV by means of an assign-
ment. The originator typically plays a role in selecting the assets to
be transferred and makes this determination based on a wide variety
of factors related to the specific goals of the transaction. 19 The origi-
nator's incentives include obtaining funds from the assets' sale, re-
ducing credit risk, and attaining capital relief.'96 In addition, the orig-
inator may receive fees from the borrower in the form of points and200
closing costs. Often, the originator is also the "sponsor" because it
often initiates the securitization'
'9 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, Supra note 22, at 191; The Synthetic Solution,
RISK.NET (May 1, 2004), http://www.isk.net/credit/feature/1522731/the-synthetic-
solution.
197 ROBBE ETAL., supra note 127, at 11-12.
198 Id.
'9 See discussion supra Part II.C. An originator can sell the assets for more than
their face value because the purchaser expects to receive interest payments and po-
tential prepayment penalties. Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, The Seven Deadly
Frictions of Subprime Mortgage Credit Securitization, 1 INVESTMENT PROF. 48, 48 (2008).
20 Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 199, at 50.
201 The "sponsor" is the party that organizes and initiates the securitization by
transferring the assets to be securitized. In addition to the originator, the sponsor
may be the arranger, an affiliate of the originator, or a party purchasing the rcceiva-
bles from the originator and selling them to the SPV. See FATEN SABRY & CHUDOZIE
OKONGWU, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF SECURITIZATION ON
CONSUMERS, INVEsTORS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE CAPITAL MARKETS 17 (2009).
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The arranger is the party that purchases the credit assets from
the originator and funds them until the securitization is finalized,
oversees the creation of the SPV, sells the assets to the SPV, and is the
202primary structurer of the transaction The arranger's activities in-
clude performing due diligence on the originator and the credit as-
sets as well as implementing structural protections for investors. 1 3 In
addition, the arranger initiates and plays a large role in the process of
204
obtaining credit ratings for the SPV's securities. An arranger may
be an independent specialized service provider but is typically a third-
party investment bank or the in-house investment banking group of
205the originator. The arranger also often acts as the underwriter for
the SPV's securities, whose function is to price and sell the SPV's se-
curities to investors (or to an asset manager acting on behalf of inves-
tors ).206 As an arranger or underwriter, the investment bank earns in-
come from fees charged to investors and any premium paid for the
SPV's securities.
207
The administrative functions of the SPV are performed primarily
by the servicer and the party that hires the servicer (the trustee). The
duties of a servicer are established by the servicing agreement.208209
They fall into two broad categories. The first is collecting payment
from the obligors of the underlying credit assets, transferring such
payments to the SPV, and related activities, such as furnishing period-
ic reports to investors, the trustee, and rating agencies.210 The second
primary duty of a servicer is to deal with defaults, delinquencies, and
202 Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-57967, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,212, 36,215 n.25 (proposed June
16, 2008) (to be codified at 17 CFR pts. 240 & 249b); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMM'N STAFF'S EXAMINATIONS OF
SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 31 (2008), available at
http://sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexaminationO70808.pdf, Ashcraft &
Schuermann, supra note 199, at 52-53.
203 See BOND MKT. ASS'N, CDO PRIMER 41 (2004), available at
http://www.public.asu.edu/-chliul /recapmarkets-dese/readings/16_CDOPrimer
BondMarketAssn.pdf.
204 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 202, at 7.
205 BOND MKT. ASS'N, supra note 203, at 41.
206 Id.; LANCASTER ET AL., supra note 46, at 176-77; Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra
note 199, at 53.
207 ROBII ET AL., supra. note 127, at 13; Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 199, at
52.
208 KOTHARJ, supra note 34, at 695. The servicing agreement may be a part of the
pooling (transfer) agreement. Id.
200 Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. REG. 1, 25-26
(2011).
210 ROBBE ET AL., supra note 127, at 43; KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 696-701.
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related issues, such as foreclosures or loan modification. When de-
fault on a credit asset occurs, a servicer has two general options: to
foreclose on and liquidate the assets or to engage in loss-mitigation
by modifying the terms of the asset (e.g., extend the repayment peri-
od or forgive some portion of the principal) 22 A servicer obtains its
income through a servicing fee based on a fixed percentage of the
unpaid collateral loans, "float" income from interest earned on funds
received but not yet distributed to SPV investors, and ancillary fees
charged to borrowers upon events, such as late payments or modifica-
tions.2 13 Distinct master servicers and special servicers may perform
the two primary functions of a servicer.
The primary role of the trustee is to act on behalf of the SPV's
investors to ensure that they get paid; its activities are governed by the
deed of trust.2 14 The basic duties of the trustee include reporting to
investors the SPV's compliance with its payment obligations and cov-
enants and monitoring the servicer.' If the servicer is unable to re-
mit payment or perform its duties, the trustee must act as both a fi-
nancial and a functional backstop.2' The trust deed also defines the
relationship among the secured creditors, including with respect to
217payment priorities and control rights. The trustee is only required
to act upon a resolution of the shareholders as authorized by the
SPV's investors•.2 " The trustee is typically an independent third-party
211)
and earns its income through a fee for its services.
A collateral (asset) manager may also be involved in managing
the securitization. The manager may or may not be an affiliate of the
220SPV and may work with or be an independent investment adviser.
An active SPV manager earns income from fees it charges to inves-
tors. These fees typically include a fixed management fee-a fee pay-
able only after investors are paid-and performance-based incentive
fees. 22 Fees may be structured as a residual and may not be paid to
211 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 209, at 26.
212 id.
21 Id. at 37-45.
24 ROBBMETAL., supra note 127, at 41-42.
25 See KOTARI, supra note 34, at 703-06; Levitin & Twomey, supra note 209, at 59.
'' Levitin & Twomey, supra note 209, at 59.
117 ROBBE ET AL., supra note 127, at 41
218 Id.
219 See KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 705.
22 See id. at 428; ROBBE ETAL., supra note 127, at 77.
2' KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 433; BARCLAYS, THE BARcLAYs CAPITAL GUIDE TO CASH
FLOW COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS 5 (2002).
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managers until all interest payments are first made to the SPV's debt
holders, but a portion of the fees may be senior to all debtholders
222
and thus first paid to the manager.
Government-approved credit rating agencies play an essential
role in the securitization process. The ultimate function of a rating
agency is to provide an assessment of the creditworthiness of credit
instruments. These agencies are regulated by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission as nationally recognized statistical ratings organ-
izations.1 The rating agencies' importance derives from the fact that
a significant portion of securitization investors are prohibited by reg-
ulation and their own internal policies from investing in securities
224rated below a certain level. Most rating agencies receive their in-
come under an "issuer pays" model, which means that an agency re-
ceives its payment from the party seeking the rating (typically the ar-
ranger).225 The short-term incentive of a rating firm is thus to rate as
many transactions as possible, while longer-term incentives include
preserving the firm's reputation for ratings' accuracy.
B. Governance Problems
Governance problems abound in the process of securitization.
These problems arise because of complexity, the involvement of nu-
merous parties, misaligned incentives, and asymmetric information.
The fundamental governance problem in a securitization transaction
arises from an incentive misalignment between credit risk sellers and
credit risk buyers. Originators, underwriters, and other risk sellers
have a primary, short-term incentive to earn fees, bonus compensa-
tion, and other benefits from closing a securitization transaction. By
contrast, investors and others exposed to the risk of securitized assets
226generally have an interest in their long-term performance.
2 See KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 433.
223 Credit Rating Agencies-NRSROs, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (May 5,
2011), http://www.sec.gov/answers/nrsro.htm.
2" FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, CREDIT RATINGS AND
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 8-9 (2010), available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdnmedia/fcic-reports/2010-0602-Credit-Ratings.pdf.; U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING
AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 6-8 (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreportO0O3.pdf. However, the role of
rating agencies will likely be significantly diminished due to financial regulators re-
moving references to credit ratings as required by the Dodd-Frank Act.
25 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 202, at 23.
226 FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF RISK
RETENTION REQUIREMENTS 11 (2011).
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1. Cash Flow Sufficiency
The fundamental economic issue in securitization is ensuring
that investors obtain the cash flows necessary to fulfill the obligations
owed to them as debtholders. Three types of economic risks may be
present when SPVs are used to transfer credit risk. First, investors
may fail to receive their expected cash flows because the underlying
collateral assets fail to pay, are prepaid (or refinanced), or their mar-
ket values or creditworthiness drop below a certain value, thereby dis-
227
rupting the cash flows to investors. Second, any intertemporal
mismatch between the payments received by the SPV and those re-
quired to be paid out to investors may leave investors short of ex-
pected cash flows. Certain securitization structures promise more
frequent payments to investors than the payments that are received
by the SPV collateral and are thus prone to liquidity risk-the
debtholders are owed a cash payment before one is received from the
228
underlying, longer-dated credit instruments. A third type of eco-
nomic risk arises when an SPV issues ongoing, particularly short-term
debt securities, and it experiences a bank-like "run" due to the fact
that investors refuse to purchase the securities and thus leave the SPV
unable to obtain funding. 9
2. Informational Asymmetries and Incentive
Misalignment
Governance problems arise from the informational asymmetries
among the various participants in the process of securitization.20 Par-
ties in earlier stages of the securitization process may have more in-
formation about the risks of particular assets or structures than those
in later stages. For example, borrowers may be more informed than
originators (lenders), and investors may be less informed than origi-
nators, underwriters, or SPV managers. Nonetheless, investors and
others exposed to the risk of securitized credit assets may overcome
informational asymmetries through due diligence, disclosures, and
skill in assessing credit quality.
A moral hazard problem may arise if, knowing that loans and
other credit assets can be sold through securitization, originators and
underwriters decrease their screening or monitoring activities, which
can thereby result in lower lending standards and the creation of risk-
227 See KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 233-34.
221 See id. at 234.
V1 CHOUDHRY, Supra note 32, at 535.
23' Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 199, at 48 ("An overarching friction which
plagues every step in the [securitization] process is asymmetric information ....").
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ier loans and other credit assets.13 An adverse selection problem may
arise if informational asymmetries lead originators or issuers to trans-
fer relatively lower quality assets in such a way that securitized assets
232
are of generally lower quality than those not securitized.
Informational asymmetries or incentive misalignment may also
extend to the specific structure of the securitization, or to the rela-
tionships among its participants, and thus may give rise to moral haz-
ard in the form of opportunistic conduct by originators, managers, or
underwriters that benefits these parties at the expense of investors.
For example, the way an SPV's cash flows are allocated may give rise
to moral hazard. If an SPV's manager has a claim to the SPV's profits
and the profits are not allocated to investors or used to absorb losses,
a manager that owns the (first loss) equity tranche has an incentive to
engage in more risk-taking than is optimal for the SPV's senior debt
233investors. In addition, a conflict of interest may occur if the ar-
ranger, the SPV manager, or another party responsible for selecting
or managing the SPV's collateral assets is influenced or controlled by
the party selling the credit assets or intending to short sell the SPV's
234
collateral or the securities it issues. Importantly, asymmetric infor-
mation may cause governance problems on an intrafirm basis as well.
To the extent that an originator or an underwriter fails to fully trans-
fer the risk associated with such assets to investors or other third par-
ties, different groups within the same firm or the entire firm may be
235
allocated the risks associated with the assets.
231 Ronel Elul, Securitization and Mortgage Default 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila.,
Working Paper No. 09-21/R, 2011) (noting the widespread argument that since the
majority of subprime loans were securitized, "issuers had less incentive to screen
those loans.., and ... this encouraged a decline in lending standards").
.2 Paul Calem et al., "Cherry Picking" in Subprime Mortgage Securtizations: Which Sub-
prime Mortgage Loans Were Sold by Depository Institutions Prior to the Crisis of 2007?, 20J.
HOUSING ECON. 120, 120 (2011); see also Kiff et al., supra note 11, at 114-15.
233 TAVAKOLI, supra note 64, at 269-70; see also id. at 99-100; KOTHIARI, supra note
34, at 228-29; MOODY'S INVESTOR SERV., INTRODUCING ASSUMPTION VOLATILITY SCORES
AND Loss SENSITIVITIES FOR STRUCTURED FINANCE SECURITIES 8 (2008). SPV managers
may also lack strong incentives to manage the collateral in the best interests of inves-
tors if their compensation is structured in ways that are not aligned with investors'
interests, such as if the manager's compensation is senior to that of the SPV's inves-
tors or is paid primarily in proportion to the amount of assets under management.
MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 142-44 (2010).
2 See LEWIS, supra note 233, at 141; YVES SMITH, ECONNED: How UNENLIGHTENED
SELF INTEREST UNDERMINED DEMOCRACY AND CORRUPTED CAPITALISM app. II, at 316-19
(2010).
235 TAVAKOLI, supra note 64, at xiv, 5-6.
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3. Flawed Credit Risk Assessment
A particular governance problem may arise from investors' reli-
ance on a process for evaluating credit risk that is fundamentally
flawed. For example, from 2002 to 2006, investors relied on credit
rating agencies that utilized flawed mathematical models in deter-
mining securitization credit ratings, did not perform their own due
diligence on data regarding the credit assets underlying the securities
they were rating, and practiced less robust post-rating surveillance on
securities than their initial process for rating.236 In addition, the fact
that most rating agencies were compensated by the arrangers or oth-
er parties seeking the rating may have compromised the integrity of
the rating process; the agency had an incentive to give a rating favor-
able to the arranger to obtain its business. 37 Flaws in rating agencies'
credit risk assessments may become less problematic after the finan-
cial crisis due to regulatory reforms,2 8 the agencies' own improve-
ments, and to the extent investors rely less on ratings in determining
the creditworthiness of securities.
4. Distressed Asset Servicing
Another potential governance problem in the securitization con-
text occurs when loans or other credit assets become delinquent or
default and the servicers lack the incentive (or ability) to modify or
foreclose on them in a way that maximizes value for the SPV's inves-
tors. Servicers may foreclose on too many loans instead of modifying
them because, among other reasons, the expenses that a servicer
must bear in foreclosing on a loan are more likely to be reimbursedS , 239
(on a timely basis) than those born in modification. Servicers' spe-
cific fee and reimbursement structures may also give them incentives
240to inefficiently delay foreclosing on delinquent loans and favorS 241
modifications that reduce interest payments instead of principal.
.. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 202, at 17-18, 21-22.
217 Id. at 23-27.
28 WEIL GOTSHAL, supra note 170, at 18-19.
211 Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure: Written Testimony Be-
fore the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, IIIth Cong. 19-28 (2010)
[hereinafter Thompson Testimony] (statement of Diane E. Thompson, Nat'l Con-
sumer Law Ctr.); Levitin & Twomey, supra note 209, at 46-47. Collective action
problems among SPV investors may also fail to discipline servicers.
240 Thompson Testimony, supra note 239, at 21-22, 26-28; Levitin & Twomey, su-
pa note 209, at 71-77.
241 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 209, at 79-81.
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To the extent that special servicers are used,242 those with a first-loss
(subordinated) position may have an incentive to unduly delay fore-
closures at the expense of senior SPV investors when a significant
243portion of loans are delinquent.
C. Governance Mechanisms
Numerous SPV governance mechanisms have as their goal re-
ducing risk to preserve the periodic payments owed to SPV investors
by overcoming agency costs. Some governance mechanisms are best
understood as trying to prevent conflicts of interest between credit
risk sellers and buyers. These mechanisms include representations
and warranties; disclosure, screening, and monitoring; and risk-
retention. Other mechanisms are primarily economic in character
and fall into one of three categories: structural credit enhancements
and liquidity facilities, triggers and tests sensitive to changes in the
SPV's performance or exposure to risk, and the ability of SPV manag-
ers to manage the assets or liabilities of the SPV to ensure non-
disrupted cash flows. Importantly, although CDSs reference various
types of asset-backed securities and hence increase price transparency
for such securities indirectly, the market infrastructure for SPV secu-
rities overall is relatively weak in the sense that there is little to no
244
secondary market for securitized credit assets.
1. Representations and Warranties
A fundamental behavioral governance device comes in the form
of written representations ("reps") and warranties contained in the
pooling and servicing agreements governing securitization transac-
tions. Reps and warranties are made by the originator or other seller
24' There are conflicting incentives and evidence regarding whether separating
the primary functions of a servicer to be performed by a master and a special servicer
is efficient. See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 209, at 79-81; Yingjin Hila Gan &
Christopher Mayer, Agency Conflicts, Asset Substitution, and Securitization 9-12, 20
(Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w12359, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=917564 (finding that special servicers not holding a first-
loss position may have an incentive for inefficient transfers to special servicing);
Brent W. Abrose et al., Servicers and Mortgage-Backed Securities Default: Theory
and Evidence 2 (Dec. 10, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1789695 (finding foreclosures of defaulted loans less likely
where master and special servicing are combined).
243 Gan & Mayer, supra note 242, at 21-22, 28.
244 Nonetheless, the market infrastructure for securitized assets seems to be signif-
icantly improving through increasing standardization of securitization assets, in-
creased transparency, liquidity with mandatory reporting of asset-backed securities to
the TRACE system for secondary market trading, and private venues such as
SecondMarket, Inc. to trade such securities.
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of the securitized assets. They are made to provide investors with
basic assurances in regards to the quality of the originator and the as-
sets being transferred.2 45 Reps and warranties are an important gov-
ernance device because the remedy for breach is not only money
damages but also the originator's obligation to repurchase upon de-
mand any assets as to which the reps and warranties are false . 4
Reps and warranties about the originator typically state that the
originator has the legal power to sell the assets free of any claims by
other parties and that any written information provided by the origi-
nator to the underwriter, the rating agency, investors, or others in re-
lation to the securitization contains no material inaccuracies or omis-
sions.14 7 Reps and warranties about the assets typically state that the
assets create legally enforceable rights to cash flows and that they
were originated in compliance with all applicable laws and underwrit-
ing standards. 24" Different asset classes, such as residential and com-
mercial mortgages, will typically have reps and warranties unique to
their class. 49 In December 2009, the American Securitization Forum
released model reps and warranties for residential mortgage-backed
250
securities.
2. Disclosure, Screening, and Monitoring
Screening and monitoring by different parties may take place at
each step in the securitization process. However, the extent of such
activities varies greatly by party, transaction structure, and type of col-
lateral. Originators may screen and monitor borrowers until the loan
is sold to the arranger. Arrangers may screen the securitized credit
assets by performing due diligence. In addition, servicers that
manage troubled assets may be monitored by master servicers, trus-
252
tees, investors, or credit rating agencies.
215 KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 680.
246 Id. at 690-92. In 2010, subprime RMBS investors began to bring lawsuits alleg-
ing mortgage securitization originators' breach of reps and warranties. RMBS Holders
in Court Battle Over Breaches of Reps and Warranties, RiSK.NET.Uan. 10, 2011),
http://www.risk.net/credit/feature /1936939/rmbs-holders-court-battle-breaches-
reps-warranties.
247 Ko,[AIJ, supra note 34, at 680-82.
2148 Id. at 682-83.
249 Id. at 682-90.
'0 Press Release, American Securitization Forum, ASF Project RESTART Releases
Model RMBS Reps and Warranties (Dec. 15, 2009).
251 See Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 199, at 52.
252 Id. at 54-55; Levitin & Twomey, supra note 209, at 58-63, 67-68.
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Screening and monitoring are only effective to the extent parties
have information to screen and monitor. Disclosure relates to the
type of information disclosed, the parties to whom it is disclosed, the
timing of the disclosure (whether it is solely upon commencement of
the transaction or also periodically), the formatting of the disclosure
(narrative, quantitative, or electronically-readable), and the extent to
which is it standardized and comparable to similar or related disclo-
sures.
There is a large body of information relating to a securitization
transaction that potentially may be disclosed, either as part of the na-
ture of the transaction, upon request, or as mandated by regulation.
For example, information about the SPV's assets as a whole is typically
disclosed, and such "pool-level" information may address the under-
writing of assets that deviate from the disclosed origination standards,
the remedies available to investors if contractual provisions are
breached, and the ability of the servicer to modify fees or impact cash
flows. Information about the actual assets collateralizing the SPV
(i.e., "loan-level" information) may also be disclosed, including in-
formation about the assets' repayment and other economic terms,
their origination, servicing, and underwriting, and information about
the underlying debtors. Originators or sponsors must disclose any
repurchase requests made by SPV investors due breach of the origi-255
nator's reps and warranties. Additional rules that mandate securiti-
zation disclosures pursuant to the SEC's amendments to Regulation
AB, including loan-level disclosures, were re-proposed on July 26,
2562011 and have yet to be finalized.
3. Risk Retention
Securitization may result in the complete transfer of credit risk
from the originator, issuer (or another party that held the risk) to the
SPV's investors. However, originators and other risk sellers may re-
25 See Asset-Backed Securities, 75 Fed. Reg. 23,328, 23,376-77 (proposed May 3,
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 229-30, 232, 239-40, 243, 249).
251 See id. at 23,255-76.
255 See Disclosure for Asset-Backed Securities Required by Section 943 of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Exchange Act No. 34-
63,741, 76 Fed. Reg. 4489 (Jan. 26, 2011); see also Issuer Review of Assets in Offerings
of Asset-Backed Securities, 76 Fed. Reg. 4231 (Jan. 25, 2011) (requiring issuers of
publicly registered asset-backed securities to review and make disclosure regarding
the underlying assets).
256 Asset-Backed Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/assetbackedsecurities.shtm (last modified
Dec. 30, 2011).
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tain some of the credit risk being transferred. Retaining credit risk
may incentivize originators to more carefully monitor and screen the
credit assets that they originate and securitize. An originator or issu-
er may retain credit risk by owning only the first-loss equity tranche of
the SPV's securities, a "vertical slice" of the securities (i.e., a fixed
portion of each tranche), or a portion of a representative sample.
Servicers may also retain credit risk by holding a first-loss position in
the SPV's securities backed by the credit assets that the servicers ser-
vice; and in this way the servicer has a greater incentive to maximize
the value of the underlying assets in default. 5v On March 31, 2011,
U.S. financial regulators acting pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act pro-
posed risk-retention rules that require securitization issuers and
sponsors to retain five percent of the credit risk that is being trans-
ferred, with exceptions for securitizations of qualified residential
2581
mortgages and other high-quality credit assets.
4. Credit Enhancement
The nature and extent of credit enhancement is an fundamental
aspect of any securitization transaction because credit enhancement
determines the securitization's overall economic value and its pricing259
structure. "Credit enhancement" is a mechanism that seeks to pro-
tect investors from the credit risks inherent in the collateral by ab-
sorbing or redirecting losses should they occur. Greater credit en-
hancement means that a structure is less leveraged-it has more
260protection against losses. In general, credit enhancement increases
the cost to the originator but also lowers the coupon on the SPV's se-
curities (i.e., lowers the cost of funding).
There are three types of credit enhancements: originator-
provided enhancements, structural enhancements, and those provid-
ed by third parties. The three most significant originator-provided
credit enhancements are excess spread, over-collateralization, and
cash. Excess spread is simply the SPV's profit: the difference in in-
come received by the SPV and its expenses. 62 It is the most common
'5' Gan & Mayer, supra 242, at 26-27.
151 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, PROPOSED RULE, CREDIT RISK RETENTION (2011),
available at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011 /34-64148.pdf. Risk retention may
result in accounting consolidation. BD. OF GovERNoRs OF THE FED., supra note 60, at
70-72.
259 KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 196, 210.
20 Id. at 210.
261 Id. at 196, 210-11.
262 Id. at211, 213.
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form of credit enhancement applicable to all collateral classes for
263
which interest and principal payments can be segregated. Excess
spread is retained by the SPV, but depending on the transaction
structure, it may also be paid to the originator up front, over a period
of time, at the end of the transaction, or when the SPV builds up a re-
264
serve of a specified amount. Over-collateralization is the extent to
which the originator sells the assets to the SPV at a lower price than
their principal value, with the remaining value held by the SPV as a
265
security interest. In addition, over-collateralization provisions may
be accompanied by an early amortization trigger. If the SPV's collat-
eral experiences losses, the trigger redirects payments to investors
266that would otherwise be reinvested.
Structural credit enhancement emanates from the payment pri-
ority of the classes of securities issued by the SPV. In a typical securit-
ization, various classes of securities are issued along a "waterfall" of
payment priorities with the senior class of securities the first to re-
ceive a periodic payment from the collateral's cash flows, the second
class to receive a payment after the first is paid, and thus down to the
last class, which is the first-loss, equity-like residual tranche.2 67 SPVs
generally issue three broad classes of securities from a payment-
priority point of view: the senior securities, the middle-tier mezzanine268
securities, and the junior (or subordinated) securities. Senior secu-
rities typically comprise by far the largest class of securities issued by
securitization SPVs, accounting for approximately ninety percent of
269the issue.
Third parties not affiliated with the originator may also provide
credit enhancement. Too much credit enhancement by a third party
exposes the securitization to the credit risk of the third party, which
could negatively impact the asset-backed securities if the third party is
downgraded or otherwise decreases in creditworthiness.2 0 Letters of
credit from banks may also provide third-party credit support.22 ' The
... Id. at 213.
2 Id.
2 KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 216.
21, Id. at 46, 239, 480-81.
267 Id. at 218. However, different pay-down methods may be used to allocate cash
flows between tranches, including a pro rata pay-down method and paying the senior
classes more quickly. Id. at 227.
26 Id. at 218.
269 Id. at 197.
270 KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 212.
271 Id. at 220.
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originator or a related party may also provide an explicit or implicit
272guarantee.
Liquidity enhancements are similar to credit enhancements. A
liquidity enhancement is a structural mechanism that provides tem-
porary cash to help ensure that investors continue to receive timely
273
repayment. Liquidity enhancements come in several forms, includ-
ing intentionally building up cash reserves and advances from the
servicer that are repaid from the collections. A second type of li-
quidity enhancement is external liquidity support from third parties,
which can range from below fifteen percent to complete, 100% sup-
275port.
5. Tests and Triggers
Disciplining an SPV as a result of negative information gained
about its ability to pay investors takes the form of various contractual-
ly agreed protection triggers and compliance tests that permit credit
risk buyers to take remedial action to ensure that the SPV meets its
obligations to them. The debt covenants of the SPV's securities,
which protect the credit risk buyers from the credit risks of the un-
derlying collateral, contain such protection triggers and compliance
276tests.
Protection triggers may require that if cumulative losses rise to a
pre-specified level, the excess spread available to the SPV be held in
cash reserve or payment priorities be increased to debtholders with
the highest priority.77 These triggers are similar to traditional debt
covenants that require acceleration or a dividend freeze in loan or
2781bond agreements.
Compliance tests may be based on an SPV's asset quality or the
sufficiency of its cash flows. Asset-quality tests may require the collat-
eral to retain a minimum average credit rating or rate of recovery if a
default were to occur, prohibit concentration in certain obligors or
industries from going above a certain maximum, and require a min-
imum average interest rate to be paid from the collateral.279 Cash-
272 Id. at 211,213; Kiffet al., supranote 11, at 114.
271 KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 225.
274 Id. at 225-26.
275 Id. at 226.
271 Id. at 200.
277 Id.
278 id.
271 KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 436-37; Tammy Cadsby, Leaking Like a SIV?, ] 0
CMBS WoRLD 36, 36 (2008) ("[A] traditional SIV is structured to include 'early warn-
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flow coverage tests mandate that certain cash flow ratios be main-
tained for the life of the SPV.28° Similarly, over-collateralzation tests
typically require that either the par value or the market value of the
SPV's collateral be approximately one-to-one to the value of the SPV's
debt per class of holders The interest-coverage test requires the in-
terest received from the SPV's collateral to be a certain multiple of
282the interest paid to the SPV's debtholders. Similar tests based on
283
the market value of the SPV's collateral exist in market-value CDOs.
A failure of the SPV to meet its asset-quality or cash-flow cover-
age tests permits debtholders to exercise control rights in various
ways depending on the type of securitization transaction and the par-
ticularities of its structuring. Failure to meet such tests may require
the SPV manager or trustee to divert cash flows from junior to senior
284tranches to ensure that senior tranches are paid. In addition, fail-
ure to meet the tests may cause an event of default. In such a case,
the SPV's senior or "controlling class" of debtholders typically have
the right to accelerate and declare as immediately payable all princi-
285pal and interest payments. An event of default also gives the same
creditors the right to exert control by liquidating the SPV's collateral
and having the proceeds paid out to all SPV investors according to
286tranche priority. However, creditors may not exercise their right to
liquidate the SPV, in part because of their expectation that the SPV
ing' signs of... capital deterioration through the use of market value capital tests...
2.. KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 437.
281 See id. at 436-38.
282 Id.
281 Market Value CDO Definition, CREDITFLUX.COM,
http://www.creditflux.com/Glossary/Market-value-CDO (last visited May 15, 2012).
284 Madlyn G. Primoff & David M Eskew, SIVs, CDOs and Structured Products in Dis-
tress: Cross-Border and Other Issues for Lenders and Investors, in AMERICAS RESTRUCTURING
AND INSOLVENCY GUIDE 2008/ 2009 134,136 ("[T]he failure of a collateral quality test
with respect to a particular tranche of debt may trigger a diversion of the CDO's cash
flow .... ."); Jeffrey Stern, Imputed Losses Becoming Real in the Current Wave of ABS CDO
Events of Default, 6 REAL EST. FIN. 1, 1 (2008).
28 Scott E. Eckas & KevinJ. Biron, Actions Heat Up Over CDO Transactions, N.Y. L.J.,
July 20, 2009, at 6.
Id. Failure to meet coverage tests and events of default has resulted in substan-
tial "tranche warfare" litigation between various classes of SPV creditors. See generally
Eric Adams, CDOs in the Financial Crisis, 15 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 11 (2010) (describing
issues faced by troubled CDOs); Cagin Pabuccu, Securitization Litigation: Classification
of Theories of Liability, 16J. STRUCTURED FIN. 65 (2010) (classifying liability theories in
post-financial crisis subprime securitization actions); Steven L. Schwarcz, Fiduciaries
with Conflicting Obligations, 94 MINN. L. REv. 1867 (2010) (establishing a theory of the
issues faced by trustees and other fiduciary dealing with conflicting beneficiaries situ-
ations such as CDO defaults).
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will eventually come back into compliance with its tests, because they
do not want the SPV to engage in a fire sale of assets, or because of
the difficulty of obtaining the requisite votes .2 An actively managed
SPV may, after failing to meet its coverage tests, be placed into a lim-
ited operating mode where additional debt cannot be issued and
where cash flows must be invested in highly liquid assets until the
28
manager is able to recuperate losses and meet coverage tests.
6. Active Management
Securitization structures are distinguishable by the extent to
which a party passively or actively manages the SPV's assets or reissues
and restructures its liabilities subsequent to the initial sale of the
SPV's debt securities. Passive management of an SPV according to
predetermined criteria includes activities such as replenishing a port-
folio when assets are depleted through repayment or amortization,
substituting one asset (or reference obligation) for another, and
completing a change of portfolio of short-term assets such as credit
card receivables. Active management of SPV assets is typically per-
formed by a specialized collateral manager. It is a governance mech-
anism because it helps ensure that SPV investors receive their pay-
ments in the face of changing collateral performance or broader
economic conditions. As described by Robb6, active management of
the SPV assets
Involve[s] a third party monitoring the ongoing performance of
the transaction and actively.. . optimizing the mix of the portfo-
lio to take advantage of market conditions and limiting the im-
pact of any downturns in the performance of the portfolio. 289
Active management of SPV collateral by a CDO manager, for ex-
ample, authorizes and requires the manager to make purchase,
sale, and risk management decisions with respect to the collateral
or, in a synthetic transaction, with respect to credit protection.9
In addition, active management can extend to managing the lia-
bilities of an SPV.2 ' Importantly, however, active managers pose a
governance problem if they are not independent-that is, if they
211 See Eckas & Biron, supra note 285; Three-Quarters of CLOs Could Hit Event of De-
fault, Says Wachovia, CREDITFLUx (Mar. 6, 2009),
http://www.creditflux.com/Issuers/2009-03-06/Threequarters-of-CLOs-could-hit-
even t-of-default-says-Wac hovia.
2p KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 468-69.
2" ROBBE ETAL., supra note 127, at 76.
"'0 Id. at 76-77. For an account of CDO manager best practices and potential de-
ficiencies, see TAVAKOLI, supra note 64, at 291-95.
2" Geoff Fuller & Elizabeth Collett, Structured Investment Vehicles-The Dullest Busi-
ness on the Planet?, 3 CAP. MKTS. LJ. 376, 377 (2008).
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are captured by and serve the interests of originators or other risk
292
sellers instead of the interests of investors.
D. SPV Governance: Conclusion and Summary Table
Good governance for funded CRT transactions requires govern-
ance mechanisms to take into account the basic characteristics of the
SPV firms created through securitization transactions. As debtors,
SPVs have a relatively low creditworthiness due to their leveraged
structure and limited operational goals, which reduces the ability of
293
an SPV to recover losses if they do begin to occur. SPVs and the se-
curities they issue are typically private, and sometimes backed by oth-
er bundled asset-backed securities, so that the cost of monitoring SPV
debtors is high. Given the high informational asymmetries in securit-
ization transactions and the potential for substantial losses, undertak-
ing costly monitoring may nonetheless be efficient. In addition, the
market infrastructure for SPV securities is relatively weak-secondary
market trading is rare and price transparency is difficult to obtain,
which means that CRT should not be relied upon as an SPV govern-
ance mechanism. Securitization transactions also suffer from nu-
merous incentive misalignments among the various parties involved.
Accordingly, an SPV governance regime characterized by strong
monitoring and significant ex ante bargaining for structural protec-
tions and covenants is likely sufficient to substantially reduce the
agency costs of securitizations and result in good governance even
with a weak market infrastructure and without risk retention by the
issuer or manager. The following table summarizes the primary gov-
ernance problems for funded securitization transactions and their
corresponding governance mechanisms:
"1 See supra note 234 and accompanying text and infra notes 313-14 and accom-
pan)ing text.
2" Oliver Renault, Cash and Synthetic CDOs, in THE HANDBOOK OF STRUCTURED
FINANCE 373, 377 (Arnaud de Servigny & NorbertJobst eds., 2007).
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Table 2: Funded Securitization Governance Problems and
SPV Governance Mechanisms
Funded Securitization
Governance Problems
SPV Cash Flow Shortages
Misaligned Incentives
SPV Governance Mechanisms
Credit
Enhancements:
Over-
Collateralization
Tranching
Cash Reserves
Excess Spread
Collateral Diversi-
fication
Liquidity En-
hancement
Protection
Triggers
Compliance Tests
Active
Management
Fraud Representations and Warranties
Credit Risk Seller Informational Disclosure, Screening, Monitoring,
Advantages Risk Retention
VI. GOOD, BAD, AND SAVVY CRT GOVERNANCE
A. The Good
This subsection analyzes the performance of well-governed CRT
transactions, such as corporate CDSs, collateralized loan obligations,
and commercial mortgage-backed securities. Although these CRT
transactions benefitted from governmental assistance programs in re-
294
sponse to the 2008 financial crisis,' and some resulted in substantial
2,4 Credit markets as a whole benefitted from the U.S. federal government's
Troubled Asset Relief Program and broader economy-wide assistance. The CMBS
market in particular benefitted from the qualification of investment-grade CMBS
tranches as collateral for government loans pursuant to the Term Asset-Backed Secu-
rities Loan Facility that lasted from June 2009 to March 2010, and to a lesser extent
to the Public-Private Investment Program. An Overall Assessment of TARP and Finan-
cial Stability: Hearing Before the Cong. Oversight Panel, 112th Cong. 93 (2011) (statement
2012] 1065
SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
losses to investors or counterparties, their outperformance of sub-
prime residential-mortgage CRT was also due to their superior gov-
ernance mechanisms.
1. CDSs Referencing Corporate Bonds
Nearly three-quarters of CDSs reference corporate bonds and,
prior to the financial crisis, totaled approximately $30 trillion in no-
tional value. 9 ' Throughout the financial crisis, the corporate CDS
market remained substantially stable despite the large and relatively
unexpected payouts required by CDS protection sellers. These pay-
outs resulted from a record number and size of corporate bankrupt-
cies, including the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (Lehman)-the
largest corporate bankruptcy in U.S. history. 2111 CDS protection sellers
were generally able to meet their obligations because of good CRT
governance. Dealers had made offsetting trades and market partici-
pants utilized and managed risk with collateral. This is why, for ex-
ample, only 7.2% ($5.2 billion) of the notional value of the CDSs
written on Lehman was actually required to be paid out.97 In addi-
tion, widespread defaults by corporate CDS protection sellers did not
occur, the contractual expectations of CDS protection buyers were
generally met, and Lehman was orderly replaced as a counterparty by
other dealers when it collapsed. As correctly noted about the CDS
market in a March 2009 report by senior financial regulators in the
United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and other na-
tions, the fact that the unprecedented credit events in the second half
of 2008 "were managed in an orderly fashion, with no major opera-
of William R. Nelson, Deputy Dir., Div. of Monetary Affairs); U.S. TREASURY DEP'T,
LEGACY SECURITIES PPIP, PROGRAM UPDATE, QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31, 2011 (2011);
Aline van Duyn & Nicole Bullock, Taif Retires as Saviour of Securitisation, FT.COM (June
30, 2010, 8:42 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/324e2304-847a-lldf-9cbb-
00144feabdcO.html#axzzlpRG851Bw.
2 See ROWADY, supra note 106, at 71 (finding that seventy-two percent of CDSs
reference corporate debt); OTC Derivatives Market Activity in the First Half of 2008, BIS
(May 19, 2009), http://wavT.bis.org/press/p0905]9.htm (estimating that the total
notional value of all CDSs as of the second half of 2008 was $41.9 trillion).
229 Peter Madigan, Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy to be Largest in History, RISK.NET
(Sept. 16, 2008), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/news/1504939/lehman-
brothers-bankruptcy-largest-history; Laura Mandaro, CDS Auctions Reach Record High
in Febluary, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 27, 2009), http://articles.marketvatch.com/2009-
02-27/news/30704279 1_inarkit-credit-default-swaps-creditex; 2009 US Coiporate
Bankruptcies Hit Third-Largest Total, FRANCE24.COM (Jan. 2010, 19:14),
http://www.france24.com/en/20100107-2009-us-corporate-bankniptcies-hit-third-
largest-total?quicktabs 1=1.
"' See DDTC Press Release, supra note 26.
28 Brettell, supra note 26.
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tional disruptions or liquidity problems" demonstrated the funda-
mental soundness of corporate CDS transactions. 99 Importantly,
good CRT governance was achieved in a bilateral CDS market that
did not use CCPs or trading platforms.
2. Collateralized Loan Obligations
Collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) are a type of CDO whose
collateral is exclusively made up of private bank loans to corpora-
tions. The loans that collateralize a CLO are relatively risky loans that
are rated below investment grade, known as leveraged loans.00 An
important feature of leveraged loans is that they are syndicated. Syn-
dicated loans are made by a group of banks with one bank typically
serving as the lead in the syndicate. CLOs often buy leveraged loans
from private equity firms that use such loans to restructure a compa-
ny or to gain control of it through a leveraged buyout. °' CLOs have
standard SPV governance mechanisms including tranching, over-
302
collateralization, and interest-coverage tests.
Prior to the financial crisis, CLOs accounted for approximately
thirty percent of CDOs, and by the end of 2010, CLOs held approxi-
mately half of all U.S. sub-investment grade loans.3 0 3 During and after
the financial crisis, CLOs were often downgraded, breached their
compliance tests due to drops in their collateral's value and, accord-
ingly, temporarily stopped making payments to junior investors.
3 0 4
However, CLO managers subsequently regained compliance with
governance mechanisms by bringing CLO SPVs back into compliance
2"' SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, OBSERVATIONS ON MANAGEMENT OF RECENT CREDIT
DEFAULT SWAP CREDIT EVENTS 2 (2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/reportO30909.pdf.
300 LANCASTER ETAL., supra note 46, at 200-01.
3" Id. at 202-03.
302 Richard W. Stewart, Collateralized Loan Obligations: A Primer, in THE HANDBOOK
OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING 646, 649-52 (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone
eds., 2007); LOAN SYNDICATIONS TRADING ASS'N, THE IMPACT OF RISK RETENTION ON
CLOS AND OTHER MEANS OF ALIGNING INCENTIVES 2 (2010), available at
Nvww.sta.org/WorkArea/downloadasset.aspx?id=1 1904.
303 LANCASTER ET AL., supra note 46, at 200; Efraim Benmelech, et al., Securitiza-
tion Without Adverse Selection: The Case of CLOs 4 (Dec. 3, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/benmelech/files/Draft_20101203_FIN
AL.pdf.
'0' Benmelech et al., supra note 303, at 6; Joy Wiltermuth, CLO Equity Seen Making
Good on Promises, SECURITIZATION INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 28, 2011),
http://www.securitizationintelligence.com/Article/2757982/CLO-Equity-Seen-
Making-Good-On-Promises.html.
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with their over-collateralization tests. 30°5 In addition, CLOs were wide-
ly upgraded in 2010, over $12 billion in new CLO issuance took place
306in 2011, and issuance in 2012 was even greater. Despite a dramatic
increase in leveraged loan defaults from 2008 through most of 2010,
there were minimal defaults in CLO tranches and virtually none for
investment-grade tranches. °7
These generally positive outcomes that took place despite the fi-
nancial crisis and the economic recession are explainable at least in
significant part by the use of governance mechanisms unique to
CLOs that allowed them to overcome the governance problems of se-
curitization. As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that empiri-
cal studies indicate that the risk of the loans making up CLO collat-
eral is generally well priced 30 and that the collateral making up a
CLO does not suffer from significant agency costs at the loan level..3 09
111 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED., supra note 60, at 63; CLO Cushions Keep Rising,
ASSET-BACKED ALERT, July 2, 2010, at 4; Deborah Festa, New Challenges Facing CLO
Managers, DEAL MAG. (Nov. 9, 2010, 1:50 PM)
http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/037321 /community/new-challenges-facing-
clo-managers.php.
... BD. OF GovERNoRs OF THE FED., supra note 60, at 63; Running Hot: 2012 CLO
Market Rolls On, LEVERAGEDLOAN.COM, (May 31, 2012, 10:06 AM),
http://www.leveragedloan.com/running-hot-2012-clo-market-by-the-
numbers/#.T8fX bsjHOp.twitter.
'07 FED. BD. OF GOvERNORS OF THE FED., supra note 60, at 62; Benmelech et al., su-
pra note 303, at 6; Memorandum from Katherine Hsu, Senior Special Counsel, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n to File No. DF Title IX-Asset-Backed Securities, Re: Meeting
with Morgan Stanley 4 (Oct. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Katherine Hsu Memorandum],
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/asset-backed-
securities/assetbackedsecurities-9.pdf.
308 See, e.g., Kara Alper & Blaise Gadanecz, The Effect of Information Asymmetries
Among Lenders on Syndicated Loan Spreads 4 (Aug. 23, 2009) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1460182 ("[W]hen participant banks
[in a syndicate] have an information inferiority in the syndicate they require a higher
spreads for the increasing risk arising from information asymmetries."); Vitaly Bord
&Joko A. C. Santos, Did the Rise of CLOs Lead to Riskier Lending? (May, 11 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1838383 (conclud-
ing that banks charge "higher interest rates on the [riskier] loans they sell to CLOs
than on their unsecuritized loans"); Regina W. Moerman, The Impact of Infor-
mation Asymmetry on Debt Pricing and Maturity (Nov. 11, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l 152863.
" Several loan syndication characteristics and activities reduce agency costs be-
tween syndicate members, including the use of covenants, the use reciprocal ar-
rangements, repeated interactions, and the syndicate size and concentration. See
Sang Whi Lee & Donald J. Mullineaux, Monitoring, Financial Distress, and the Structure
of Commercial Lending Syndicates (Fin. Mgmt, Working Paper Vol. 33, No. 3, 2004);Jian
Cai, Competition or Collaboration? The Reciprocity Effect in Loan Syndication (Apr.
21, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1362454;
Nishant Dass et al., Syndicated Loans: The Role of Covenants in Mitigating Lender
Disagreements (Feb. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
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To reduce agency costs between credit risk sellers and CLO investors,
the lead bank typically retains a portion of the loan to expose it to the
same risk as the risk of CLO investors. Using a sample of securitized
leveraged loans originated between 1997 and 2007, Benmelech,
Dlugosz, and Ivashina found no evidence consistent with the exist-
3101
ence of adverse selection in the CLO market. CLO managers are
also compensated in part by a subordinated fee and a performance-
based fee structure that likely helps align their incentives with the in-
centives of the CLO's investors.3 ' CLOs are also actively managed,
which enables managers to trade loan assets to reduce losses. 2 In
addition, CLO managers are independent of the banks originating
313the CLO collateral, and therefore are not subject to the influence
of originators, which could cause managers to benefit originators at
the expense of investors. CLO investors also receive loan-level disclo-
sures,3 14 but CLO managers typically retain very little, if any, credit
risk in the securitization.3 5
3. Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities
Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBSs) are debt secu-
rities collateralized by mortgages obtained to purchase commercial
real estate, including office space and shopping malls.3 1 6 Compared
to RMBSs, CMBSs have relatively lower prepayment risk, a smaller
number of loans per SPV, and a higher number of tranches and de-
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1786141; Kamphol Panyagometh & Gordon S. Roberts,
Loan Syndicate Structure: Evidence from Ex Post Data (Jan. 14, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 083707.
310 Benmelech et al., supra note 303, at 25. Indeed, the authors find evidence that
securitized leveraged loans performed better than their non-securitized counter-
parts. Id.
3" BD. OF GOvERNORS OF THE FED., supra note 60, at 46-47; LOAN SYNDICATIONS
TRADING ASS'N, supra note 302, at 6-9; Comment Letter from Bram Smith, Exec. Dir.,
Loan Syndications Trading Ass'n, to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al.,
6-7 (Aug. 1, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-11/s71411-
223.pdf.
" LOAN SYNDICATIONS TRADING ASS'N, supra note 302, at 2.
313 See id. (" [T]he [CLO] asset manager tells the structuring bank which loans to
buy. The asset manager is the driving force, not the structuring bank, and the asset
manager continues to have discretion over asset purchase and disposition in the
portfolio after closing."); Memorandum from Jay Knight, Special Counsel, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n, to File No. S7-14-11 (June 13, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-11/s71411-65.pdf (stating that CLO managers
are "separate from the bank that sells the assets").
' LOAN SYNDICATIONS TRADING ASS'N, supra note 302, at 2.
115 Id. at 3-4
"'6 KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 363-64.
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gree of subordination. CMBSs have common credit enhancements
and also unique ones, such as over-collateralization at the loan lev-
el. 
317
After the collapse in residential mortgage real estate value, it was
widely expected that the commercial real estate market would be the
"next shoe to drop" in 2008 or 2009. Commercial real-estate values,
however, never experienced the level of decline that occurred in res-
idential markets."' Unlike RMBS, there has not been a significant
devaluation of the highest rated CMBS tranches. 3 9 Despite a rapid
increase in defaults and delinquencies in loans collateralizing
CMBSs, 32 losses for investment-grade CMBS tranches issued prior to
the financial crisis are unlikely to exceed fifteen percent.32' Although
CMBS issuance came to a near standstill in 2009 following the finan-
cial crisis, CMBS issuance is estimated to have surged to approximate-
ly to $45 billion in 2011, which is up from a 2009 low of $3.4 billion
(but still far from a peak of $234 billion in 2007) .
CMBSs have several SPV governance mechanisms that help ex-
plain why CMBS performed well on an absolute basis and relative to
subprime mortgage-related CRT transactions.12' First, as a matter of
commercial practice, the most subordinated (junior or "B piece")
117 Id. at 373-74; BD. OF GOVERNORS OFTHE FED., supra note 60, at 44.
31' Commercial Property Has Bounced Back, but Only in the Best Locations, ECONOMIST
(Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/18250397; Heidi N. Moore, The
Accidental CMBS Recovery, FORTUNE.COM (July 13, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/20l0/07/13/news/economy/CMBSaccidentalrecovery.fo
rtune/index.htm.
"' Robert Brown, Financial Reform and the Subsidization of Sophisticated Investors' Ig-
norance in Securitization Markets, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 105, 116 (2010); BD. OF
GOVERNORS OFTHE FED., supra note 60, at 53-55.
320 See BRITTJOHNSON ET AL., FITCH RATINGS, U.S. CMBS 2010 LOAN DEFAULT STUDY
1 (2011), available at
http://www.hotelnewsnow.com/media/File/PDFs/Reports/20110526_CMBSdefault
.pdf; Cong. Oversight Panel, Commercial Real Estate Losses and the Risk to Financial
Stability 67-68 (2010).
12 Katherine Hsu Memorandum, supra note 307, 4.
322 Mark Heschmeyer, 2011 Brings a Resurgent CMBS Market, More CRE Liquidity,
COSTAR.COM (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.costar.com/News/Article/2011-Brings-a-
Resurgent-CMBS-Market-More-CRE-Liquidity/126682; Sarah Mulholland, General
Growth Taps UBS, Morgan Stanley as CMBS Sales Surge, BLOOMBERG.COM (Mar. 3, 2011,
12:25 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-03/general-growth-taps-ubs-
morgan-stanley-to-refinance-u-s-mall-properties.html.
323 See Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, CMBS Subordination, Ratings Inflation,
and the Crisis of 2007-2009, at 2 (June 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclbe/Wallacecmbx-paper.pdf ("[T] he
CMBS market did not perform noticeably worse during the crisis of 2007-2009 than
it had done numerous times in recent history ... ").
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tranche is typically purchased by specialist firms that have the exper-
tise and information necessary to adequately monitor the CMBS SPV
and also to appropriately service troubled loans. 4 CMBSs are also
governed in a way that minimizes prepayment risk. Commercial real-
estate loans typically have prepayment prohibitions and penalties that
not only protect CMBS investors from prepayment risk but, more im-
portantly, incentivize borrowers to take out loans for commercial
properties that are less likely to default in the first place. CMBS in-
vestors are also generally prohibited from having access (recourse) to
the borrower's assets in case that a foreclosure sale does not result in
sufficient proceeds to cover the loan. Accordingly, CMBSs must be
paid out solely of the income (rent) derived from the commercial re-
al estate loan,3 8 which in turn means that lenders must ensure that
the property itself will generate sufficient income to cover the loan.327
Thus, commercial real estate loans are free from the problems inher-
ent in attempting to determine and rely on a borrower's general cre-
328ditworthiness, including lowering underwriting standards. In addi-
tion, the fact that fewer loans collateralize a CMBS SPV compared to
an RMBS SPV (due to the much larger size of the former) means that
performing due diligence on underlying loans is relatively less costly
and that potential governance problems from informational asymme-
tries are reduced.3" Finally, unlike RMBS securitizations, CMBSs have
a special servicer that has greater flexibility to work out troubled
loans and that can be fired by investors whose cash flows are at risk.
Two weak links in CMBS governance prior to the financial crisis
were decreased monitoring from B-piece buyers when such tranches
were purchased by CDOs33 ' and less credit enhancement in the form
.2 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED., supra note 60, at 44; see also David P. Jacob &
Frank J. Fabozzi, The Impact of Structuring on CMBS Class Performance, 29 J. PORTFOLIO
MGMT. 76, 77 (2003).
125 Brown, supra note 319, at 126-27.
526 KOTHARI, supra note 34, at 365.
127 Id.; Brown, supra note 319, at 131.
328 Brown, supra note 319, at 131.
329 An important structural change expected to take hold in CMBSs involves fewer
tranches in a deal with a maximum of three or four. CMBS Comeback Slow but Steady,
ICSC (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.icsc.org/apps/news-item.php?id=2712.
3' Brown, supra note 319, at 141-42.
"' CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 320, at 22-23; Levitin & Wachter, supra
note 23, at 61-67; Chris Macke, Mortgage Backed Securities: Snake Oil or Scapegoats?,
FORBES.COM (June 28, 2011, 11:30 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2011/06/28/mortgage-backed-
securities-snake-oil-or-scapegoats.
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of decreased subordination of CMBS tranches through 2007.2 In
addition, originators and issuers of CMBS typically do not retain any
credit risk transferred to investors.
B. The Bad: Subprime RMBS Risk Transfer
The financial crisis had its roots in two types of CRT transac-
tions: cash CDOs whose collateral consisted primarily of subprime
RMBS and the unfunded tranches of synthetic CDOs referencing
subprime RMBS. Each of these transaction types caused billions of
dollars of losses to financial institutions due to the lack of sufficient
governance over what turned out to be severely underpriced RMBS
risk. The poorly governed transactions also ultimately caused the
bank-like runs on financial institutions and off-balance sheet vehicles
that used such instruments to collateralize their short-term funding.
1. CDOs of Subprime RMBS
CDOs can be collateralized by any type of credit asset. CDOs that
purchase other securitized credit assets are referred to as ABS CDOs,
or structured finance CDOs. 334 CDOs that purchase and hence are
collateralized by investment grade tranches of RMBSs are known as
high-grade ABS CDOs, CDOs that purchase mezzanine tranches of
RMBS are known as mezzanine ABS CDOs, and CDOs that purchase
the securities issued by ABS CDOs are known as CDO-squareds
ABS CDO issuance grew dramatically in the years preceding the hous-
ing and financial crisis and peaked in 2006 at $217 billion. 3 1 While
the market was growing, ABS CDOs also became increasingly collat-
eralized by residential mortgage-backed securities, and by 2005, the
overwhelming majority of mezzanine RMBS tranches were purchased
by CDOs. 337 Indeed, structured finance CDOs and CDO-squareds
were created primarily to purchase mezzanine tranches of RMBS and
CDOs because there were no other buyers.33 The issuance of ABS
CDOs grew rapidly until 2007 but came to a halt with the onset of the
housing crisis. Subsequently, the overwhelming majority of invest-
32 Stanton & Wallace, supra note 323, at 3.
"' See text accompanying supra note 21.
3" INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABIuITY REPORT: CONTAINING
SYSTEMIC RISKS AND RESTORING FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS 59 (2008).
5 id.
32 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 22, at 9,13.
131 Id. at 130.
33 INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 334, at 59; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra
note 22, at 132.
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ment-grade ABS CDOs were downgraded to junk levels,' 39 and as of
February 2009, global write downs of ABS CDOs totaled over $218 bil-
lion, with approximately half of such securities defaulting.340 These
losses were incurred not just by ABS CDO investors (the credit risk
buyers), but also by the financial institutions that created them (the
risk sellers). As of October 2008, ABS CDO write downs for
Citigroup, AIG, and Merrill Lynch totaled approximately $34 billion,
$33 billion, and $26 billion, respectively. 34 ' Estimated lifetime losses
for investment grade tranches of mezzanine and high grade ABS
CDOs are between seventy-five to ninety percent and sixty to seventy
percent, respectively:
2
Losses from ABS CDOs collateralized in large part by subprime
RMBS were the result of numerous governance deficiencies. Active
management of ABS CDOs by managers failed to achieve any sem-
blance of diversification: they ultimately came to be heavily collateral-
ized by the riskiest type of mortgage related credit assets. 43 ABS CDO
investors placed too much reliance on flawed credit risk assessments
by ratings agencies.44 ABS CDO investors also failed to properly
screen or monitor the underlying mortgage-related assets due to not
examining loan-level disclosures and the high cost of monitoring the
subprime RMBS collateral. 4 5 Transparency was generally hindered
... FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 224, at 32.
... Efraim Benmelech & Jennifer Dlugosz, The Credit Rating Crisis 15-16 (Nat'l Bu-
reau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15045, 2009); Paul J. Davies, Half of All
CDOs of ABS Failed, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, at 25.
3"' Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 340, at 38 tbl.9.
"' Katherine Hsu Memorandum, supra note 307, at 4.
34 Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 340, at 2.
14 Misperceptions of credit risk were based upon underestimation of various fac-
tors such as correlations between collateral and tranche defaults and the sensitivity of
CDOs to cash flows from their underlying credit assets. SeeJoshua Coval et al., The
Economics of Structured Finance, 23J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 15, 23 (2009); Kilian Plank, Struc-
tured Credit Risk and the Crisis 2-3 (Dec. 5, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), avail-
able at http://campus-for-
finance.com/filebrowser/files/Papers/TTC of_CDOs_2010_12_05_vl.pdf.
,45 Even credit rating agencies rating subprime RMBS relied only on pool-level
data and not on loan-level data. U.S. SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N, supra note 202, at 35
("[Riating agencies . . .did not appear to use loan-level data as part of the surveil-
lance process."). Importantly, however, loan-level disclosures could be obtained
through third parties. Larry Cordell et al., Collateral Damage: Sizing and Assessing the
Subprime CDO Crisis 22 (Fed. Res. Bank Phil. Working Paper No. 11-30/R, 2012),
available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-
data/publications/working-papers/2 0 11/wpll-30.pdf. In addition, direct holders of
mezzanine subprime ABS CDO tranches would likely have greater incentives to mon-
itor subprime RMBS than mezzanine ABS CDO managers, which may have shorter
term investment horizon. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 22, at 133.
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by structural complexity from the inclusion of numerous credit assets,
340increased tranching, resecuritizations, and heterogeneity in con-347
tract structures. Servicers of RMBSs lacked incentives to modify
troubled mortgages and instead likely over-foreclosed on assets in
ways that was detrimental to CDO investors. Weaknesses in market
infrastructure also led to lack of secondary market trading and price
discovery, which enabled managers of ABS CDOs who were captured
by originators or underwriters to create artificial demand for mezza-
nine RMBS tranches and other CDOs that constituted the ABS CDO
3481
collateral. CDOs were also structured with less and insufficient
credit enhancements, such as decreased levels of subordination, 49
and over time CDO managers retained less risk in the form of equity
investments. In addition, reps and warranties of underlying RMBSs
were not adequately tailored and their breaches were
underenforced: Finally, buyers of ABS CDOs credit risk had a
short-term interest in the instruments due to bank capital regula-
tions, which afforded immediate capital relief to banks holding the
352instruments, and to negative basis trades, which permitted the im-
mediate recognition of profits.
.4 Manuel Adelino, Do Investors Rely Only on Ratings? 42 (Nov. 24, 2009) (un-
published manuscript), available at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=l 0.1.1.156.989&rep=repl &type
=pdf.
347 Levitin & Wachter, supra note 23, at 50, 57.
.48 Jake Bernstein & Jesse Eisinger, Banks'Self-Dealing Super-Charged Financial Crisis,
PROPUBLICA.COM (Aug. 26, 2010, 10:09 PM),
http://www.propublica.org/article/banks-self-dealing-super-charged-financial-crisis;
see also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 22, at 133-34.
'"9 See Cordell et al. supra note 345, at 7-8; Anna Katherine Barnett-Hart, The Sto-
ry of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis 15 (Mar. 19, 2009) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/students/dunlop/2009-CDOmeltdown.pdf.
. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRYCOMM'N, supra note 22, at 190.
' See Press Release, American Securitization Forum, ASF Releases Model Repre-
sentations and Warranties to Bolster Risk Retention and Transparency in Mortgage
Securitizations (Dec. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.americansecuritization.com/index.aspx?id=381 1 ("Many market partici-
pants, including institutional investors, believe that the representations and warran-
ties in previous transactions and their related repurchase provisions have not effec-
tively aligned incentives of originators and investors to produce the highest quality
loans.").
33' Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, in RESTORING
FINANCIAL STABILI1Y57, 59 (2009).
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2. Unfunded Super Senior Tranches
Super senior tranches of synthetic CDOs that referenced sub-
prime RMBS caused catastrophic losses at financial institutions ex-
posed to the instruments in 2007 and 2008. A super senior tranche is
the safest, last-loss class of instrument issued pursuant to a synthetic
CDO.3 53 Until the financial crisis, the super senior tranche of synthet-
ic CDOs typically accounted for approximately eighty percent of syn-
thetic CDO tranches. 3 4 Importantly, the super-senior tranches were
unfunded. This means that, just like with a CDS, holders of super-
senior tranches received premium payments but were only required
to make a protection payment if the CDO's losses exceeded the no-355
tional value of the funded notes. These tranches are referred to as
"super senior" because the CDO's funded subordinated tranches, in-
cluding those with the highest investment grade rating, would have to
first be completely wiped out before the super senior tranches are re-
quired to make a payment.
Certain financial institutions were massively exposed to super
senior risk through either one of two channels. First, banks engaged
in synthetic securitization often retained super senior tranches. They
retained the risk because they earned fees from the tranche,3 6
misvalued the tranche, obtained regulatory capital relief, or were un-
able to sell their risk to other parties. For example, out of
Citigroup's $55 billion balance sheet exposure to subprime loans at
the end of 2007, seventy-eight percent was in the form of unfunded
351
super senior CDO tranches. Merrill Lynch, for its part, had re-
tained $28.9 billion in super senior tranches as of May 2007.15' Leh-
man Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Morgan Stanley likewise built up
significant direct exposures to subprime-backed super seniors. 60 Se-
353 See ELAIN BUCKBERG ET AL., NERA, SUBPRIME AND SYNTHETIC CDOs: STRUCTURE,
RISK, AND VALUATION 15-17 (2010), available at http://www.nera.com/nera-
files/PUBCDOsStructureRiskValuation0610.pdf.
'5' See id at 17.
355 Id.
156 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 22, at 197.
157 Id. at 196, 257.
15' GILLIAN TETr, FOOL'S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM oF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P.
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 205
(2009); Citigroup, 2007 Annual Report (FormlO-K) at 90 (Feb. 22, 2008)
("[Citgroup's] continuing involvement in synthetic CDOs generally includes ...
owning a portion of the capital structure of the CDO, in the form of both unfunded
derivative positions [which are] primarily super senior exposures.").
... TETT, supra note 358, at 254.
1 Id. at 202-04.
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cond, super senior risk was often transferred to highly rated protec-
tion sellers, almost exclusively to AIG or monoline bond insurers.36'
By the end of 2007, the notional value of CDS protection that AIG
sold on banks' super senior swaps was $78 billion. Around the same
time, bond insurers collectively sold $125 billion worth of CDS pro-
363
tection on super seniors.
When subprime RMBSs began to lose their value, banking insti-
tutions that retained long positions in super senior CDOs had to take
massive write downs.364 In addition, as holders of super senior
tranches, the banks had to pay short investors, such as hedge funds,
or other divisions in their own firm, if the CDO had burned through
the capital supplied by funded investors and could not cover all the
losses. For example, UBS super senior exposures constituted about
seventy-five percent of its CDO trading desk's losses (and fifty percent
316
of the bank's total losses) by year-end 2007. AIG was also required
to post $19.7 billion of collateral by August 2008 due to being a super
senior swap counterparty as the value and quality of mortgage-related
assets decreased along with the mortgage market downturn.367 In ad-
dition, because certain bond insurers were unable to meet their obli-
gations as sellers of CDS protection on super seniors, firms that
bought CDS protection from the insurers on their super seniors were
left exposed. Merrill Lynch, for example, had to set aside $13 billion
366
and took a net credit valuation loss of $10.4 billion.
The fundamental problem with super senior CDO tranches is
that even though they are unfunded CRT instruments like CDSs, par-
ties that held super seniors directly (or indirectly by selling CDS pro-
tection) did not adopt counterparty governance mechanisms. First,
neither the super senior tranches nor the CDSs were mediated by
dealers. Accordingly, none of the dealer-initiated governance mech-
anisms such as vetting and running a balanced book were adopted.
' This is because those firms' high credit ratings and treatment under applicable
regulatory capital rules allows the firms purchasing super senior swaps to maximize
the value of the synthetic CDO and often to execute negative basis trades.
.62 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRYCOMM'N, supra note 22, at 577 n.82.
Bond Insurer Downgrades Could Lead to Bank Downgrades, RESEARCH REcAP (Feb. 5,
2008), http://www.alacrastore.com/blog//index.php/2008/02/05/bond-insurer-
downgrades-could-lead-to-bank-downgrades.
36 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 22, at 257, 264-65.
Id. at 142, 197.
SHAREHOLDER REPORT ON UBS's WRITE-DowNs 14-15 (2008), available at
www.ubs.com/1/ShowMedia/.../agm?...080418ShareholderReport.pdf.
Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 40 (Mar. 2, 2009).
Merrill Lynch, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 18, 23, 34 (Feb. 24, 2009).
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This left the financial system with significant one-way risk from super
seniors. Second, even when AIG or certain bond insurers sold CDS
protection on super seniors, none of them posted collateral and
hence had no mechanism to give parties an indication of the value of
their positions or prevent them from taking on more risk. Indeed,
despite losing their AAA rating in 2005 and being aware of the grow-
ing risks in the housing markets, AIG continued to sell CDSs, ignored
dealer quotes for related CDSs indexes, and did virtually nothing to
hedge the firm's exposures until it was too late.369 Had swaps dealers
been taking one side of the super senior risk and had collateral been
posted, it is unlikely that super senior exposures would have ever
grown so large. In addition, regulatory capital relief and the ability to
execute negative basis trades gave financial institutions short-term in-
centives to create synthetic CDOs and hence their super senior
tranches.
C. The Savvy: Subprime Shorts
In contrast to the bad CRT transactions that leave both parties
worse off are the savvy transactions where either the credit risk seller
or the risk buyer benefits from the transaction at the expense of the
other. Of course, CDSs and other derivatives are by definition a zero-
sum game where the risk seller's loss must be the risk buyer's gain.
What distinguishes savvy transactions in the CRT context is that, even
though both parties have access to the same information regarding
the underlying credit risk being transferred, the savvy party better
understands the underlying credit risks, how those risks should be
priced into a CRT structure, and how to structure and position itself
in a CRT transaction to benefit from its superior understanding.
Savvy transactions are exemplified by hedge funds that used syn-
thetic CDO structures to take a short position in the residential hous-
ing market prior to the financial crisis. Due to increasing deteriora-
tion in the ABX.HE index in 2006 and 2007, which served as a
bellwether for the impending real estate crash,3 70 and the perception
among some market participants that the value of securities backed
by residential mortgages were overvalued, certain firms began to use
synthetic CDOs to reduce their existing exposures and even profit
from a housing market collapse. 71
... FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 22, at 141-42; id. at 266 (noting that
AIG refused to hedge its exposures); id. at 271.
370 id. at 190-91.
171 Id. at 193-95.
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One such firm was the hedge fund managed by John Paulson,
which used Goldman to act as the underwriter in the Abacus 2007-
372ACI synthetic CDO (Abacus). The Abacus transaction reflected
Paulson's superior assessment of subprime mortgage risk and how
that risk should be priced into a CRT transaction with a certain level
of governance. Using CDSs, Paulson transferred to less savvy inves-
tors the credit risk of 90 Baa2-rated mid-prime and subprime RMBS
through a synthetic CDO. The result was that Paulson held short po-
sitions with respect to the super senior tranches and the CDO's fund-313
ed notes. Abacus was also purposely structured with relatively bad
governance to benefit Paulson. Abacus contained no over-
collateralization or interest coverage cash flow diversion triggers,374
which benefitted Paulson because such governance mechanisms
would have protected the CDO's long investors as losses to the sub-
prime reference assets occurred.7
VII. CONCLUSION
The analysis of CRT governance in this Article suggests that un-
funded CRT transactions can be well governed by counterparty gov-
ernance mechanisms consisting of bilateral monitoring, collateraliza-
tion, and a robust market infrastructure. Likewise, good governance
for funded CRT transactions such as CDOs can be achieved through
SPV governance mechanisms consisting of strong monitoring, sub-
stantial ex ante specification of creditors' rights, and active SPV man-
agement. A review of actual practices in the CDS and securitization
markets indicates that market participants typically do adopt govern-
ance mechanisms sufficient for the transactions to substantially over-
72 Shenn & Ivry, supra note 3.
... Submission on Behalf of Goldman, Sachs & Co. at 11, 14, In re Abacus CDO,
No. HO-10911, (S.E.C. 2009); GOLDMAN SACHS, ABACUS 2007-ACI: $2 BILLION
SYNTHETIC CDO REFERENCING A STATIC RMBS PORTFOLIO SELECTED BY ACA MGMT.,
LCC, 14 (2007), available at
http://www.math.nyu.edu/faculty/avellane/ABACUS.pdf; DARRELL DUFFIE, THE
ABACUS 2007 AC-1 DEAL STRUCTURE AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES (2010), available at
http://wwv.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events-media/ABACUS%20
2007%20AC1 %20Deal%20Structure%20and%201nvestment%201ncentivesDarrell%
20Duffie.pdf; David Harper, Goldman's Abacus Illustrated, BIONIcTURTLE.COM (Apr. 23,
2010), http://Arv.bionicturtle.com/how-to/article/goldmans-abacusstructure
-illustrated; Steve Waldman, Deconstructing Abacus, Interfluidity, INTERFLUIDITY.COM
(Apr. 25, 2010), http://www.interfluidity.com/v2/814.html.
314 GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 373, at 15.
175 GREGORY ZUCKERMAN, THE GREATEST TRADE EVER: THE BEHIND-THE-SCENES
STORY OF HOWJOHN PAULSON DEFIED WALL STREET AND MADE FINANCIAL HISTORY 180
(2010).
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come their agency costs. The only recent exceptions were certain
cash and synthetic CDO transactions that transferred the credit risk
of subprime RMBSs. These systemically destabilizing transactions
were poorly governed. To the extent policy reforms are necessary,
they should accordingly narrowly target the uniquely bad governance
of subprime residential mortgage-related CRT, but not the CDS or
securitization markets more broadly.
The Dodd-Frank Act and related regulatory, accounting, and
other policy initiatives bring greater regulation and oversight to most
CDS and securitization transactions. The primary goals of such initia-
tives include bringing greater transparency and more effective risk
management to CRT by, for example, requiring CDSs to be cleared
and settled through a clearinghouse, securitization disclosures to be
greater and more standardized, and securitization risk sellers to have11 376
"skin in the game" through mandatory risk retention. In imple-
menting the Dodd-Frank Act, regulators should keep in mind four
implications of CRT governance.
First, different CRT instruments can be substitutes for each oth-
er. Thus, to the extent that policymakers increase the cost of one
type of CRT instrument relative to another, parties may substitute in
a way that undermines regulatory goals. For example, CDSs can be a
substitute CRT mechanism for CDOs and, accordingly, regulation
that increases the cost of securitization may increase the size and
scope of the CDS market (and would likely do so mainly for the type
of CDSs that cannot be centrally cleared or exchange traded because
CDSs that reference credit assets that would otherwise make up CDO
collateral are relatively nonstandardized).
Second, because different governance mechanisms may be sub-
stitutes for each other, to the extent that market participants resolve
underlying governance problems, additional governance mandates
may be redundant and unnecessarily costly. For example, it is possi-
ble that the American Securitization Forum's Project RESTART,
which seeks to improve transparency and product standardization in
377the securitization markets, reduces informational asymmetries so
much that mandatory risk-retention requirements are unnecessary to
align incentives. Already improved governance mechanisms in both
376 SeeWEIL GOTSHAL, supra note 170, at 11-14, 17-18.
177 ASF Releases Final Project RESTART Model RMBS Repurchase Principles, AM.
SECURITIZATION F. (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://www.americansecuritization.com/story.aspx?id=3461 (noting that the pur-
pose of "Project RESTART [is] to increase transparency and standardization in
RMBS transactions").
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commercial and residential securitization call into question the need
for government mandates. In addition, a potentially significant
benefit from the Dodd-Frank Act is its requirement that regulators
eliminate statutory references to credit ratings and adopt alternative
measures of creditworthiness for debt securities. 379 To the extent that
this results in market participants relying on more effective measures
of credit risk, it will likely reduce the need for mandating other gov-
ernance devices that seek to reduce informational asymmetries in
CRT transactions.
Third, there are likely important tradeoffs between regulatory
goals, such as transparency, liquidity, and standardization, that may
cause attempting to further one goal to come at the expense of oth-
ers. For example, attempting to promote contract standardization by
penalizing non-clearable, customized CDSs with onerous capital re-
quirements may decrease the willingness of parties to use CDSs to re-
duce risk and thereby may reduce the liquidity of their reference in-
struments.3 0 Likewise, at some point, increasing the transparency of
CRT instruments may come at the expense of reducing their liquidi-381
ty. The danger of reducing liquidity should be of particular con-
cern to policymakers since a lack of liquidity was arguably a more sig-
nificant problem in CRT markets during the financial crisis than the
lack of transparency.
Finally, because credit risk cannot be eliminated once created,
but can only be reallocated, regulators should be sure that mandates
do not inadvertently concentrate risk. For example, CDS clearing-
houses by definition concentrate counterparty risk and are likely to
become a new class of "too big to fail" entities. In addition, credit
risk-retention mandates may prevent flawed securitization transac-
tions from taking place, but they may also unduly concentrate credit
risk in systemically important institutions (as opposed to allowing
credit risk to be fully transferred to investors). Accordingly, whatever
benefits may accrue from CDS clearing and securitization risk-
retention mandates, policymakers should weigh them against their
potential of increasing systemic risk.
378 See Shadab, supra note 25.
3'9 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 939, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
30 Debt instrument generally become more liquid when CDSs reference them.
38' See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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